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THE declaratory judgment, now adopted in thirty-three Ameri-
can states and territories, has demonstrated its value in the speedy
and effective determination of numerous controversies involving
status, contracts and other written instruments, and property rela-
tions. Its utility in the adjudication of conflicting claims between
the citizen and the administration, however, a field of litigation to
which it is admirably suited, has not been fully appreciated. It is
not merely its speed, inexpensiveness, and efficiency which commend
the judicial declaration of rights in administrative law, nor yet the
fact that it enables disputes to be determined in their incipiency
before they have ripened into full-grown destructive battles, and that
a decision is obtainable without the prior necessity of a purported
violation of law or precarious leap in the dark. It is rather the fact
(1) that administrative officials in the performance of their duties
or in challenges to the validity of their acts require no coercive
remedies or sanctions, but merely a declaration of their legal rela-
tions, in order to remain, or be kept, within the bounds of legality;
and (2) that the procedural vehicles by which administrative acts
are submitted to judicial review, namely, the extraordinary legal
remedies and injunction, have accumulated so vast a cargo of techni-
calities that the citizen desirous of challenging an administrative
power or privilege finds himself frequently engulfed in a procedural
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bog which bars him from his goal. Nor has the officer under present
practice any effective method of himself raising the issue of legality
when challenged, but must await the litigating initiative of his
adversary.
With the growing complexity of government and the constantly
increasing invasions of private liberty, with ever widening powers
vested in administrative boards and officials, the occasions for con-
ffict and dispute are rapidly augmenting in frequency and impor-
tance. Yet the very fact that such disputes turn mainly upon ques-
tions of law involving the line marking the boundary between private
liberty and public restraint, between private privilege and immunity,
on the one hand, and public right and power, on the other, makes this
field of controversy peculiarly susceptible 'to the expeditious and
pacifying ministrations of the declaratory judgment. It is manifest
that, when the cumbersome and technical writs of certiorari, injunc-
tion, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, prohibition, are di-
rected against public bodies and officials, what is really sought is an
adjudication on the law, establishing and determining their powers
and privileges. Yet under the antiquated common law notion that
courts exist only for purposes of compulsion and condemnation, dis-
putes as to legal rights had perforce to be framed in the guise of
combats looking to coercion of the defendant. The technicalities
with which the law and its practitioners traditionally endow its
instrumentalities have encrusted these extraordinary remedies for
controlling the administration with a mass of procedural refinements
alien to their original purpose and crippling to their efficiency for a
twentieth century society, so that a citizen seeking a declaration of
the illegality of an administrative act often finds himself enmeshed
in the intricacies of certiorari, injunction, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus, or prohibition, and may never reach the substantive
goal he has in view. At all events, he has often been forced into
a mystic maze, whereas he wished merely to ascertain whether the
regulation or order served upon him, or to which he had been sub-
jected, is valid or not, or, if valid, what it means.
The inconvenience and inexpediency of these coercive remedies
against public officials, with all their pitfalls and expense for the
complaining citizen and the administration as well, are heightened by
the fact that, under a more efficient procedure, they would in most
cases be quite unnecessary, for very few officials are likely to violate
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
their duties and exceed their powers, when these are conclusively
delimited and declared by the decision of a court. The reluctance of
courts to mandamus or enjoin officials, often for sound reasons, is an
indication of their special position-a fact which makes a declaration
of their duty as effective as a command to perform it or an injunction
not to transgress. Execution is not necessary to give conclusive
effect to judgments declaring the powers and disabilities of public
officials and bodies.1 With respect to the administration as a de-
fendant, a declaration of the law is all that the litigating citizen
desires or needs, and procedural obstacles placed in the way of such
adjudication constitute an impairment and impeachment of the ad-
ministration of justice.
In his dealings with the Government, the citizen desires, and
should have, the speediest and most inexpensive method of raising
questions, which for the most part will be of law, going to the valid-
ity or the construction or interpretation of an administrative order.
The avalanche of legislation and adminstrative decree which char-
acterizes modem government has brought in its train an increasing
number of commissions and'officials whose powers, as they affect
private activity, are a constant source of objection, doubt, debate,
and dispute. For the more speedy and convenient settlement of
difference, administrative tribunals in growing number have been
established, for under a constitutional government, the jurisdiction
and powers of official bodies are always a subject of judicial chal-
lenge and review. Hence, the constitutionality of statutes and ordi-
nances and the validity and legality of administrative action there-
under are a constant subject of litigation. The fact that doubt and
uncertainty as to the law need no longer, by the aid of the declara-
tory action, be clothed in the guise of hostility and combat, is one
of the many advantages of the action for a declaration of rights.
And one of its exceptionally valuable functions lies in the fact that
it enables not only the individual to raise the question of the valid-
ity of governmental action without purporting first to violate an
'Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 47 Sup. Ct. 511 (1927);
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U. S. 716, 724, 49
Sup. Ct. 499, S02 (1929). Judgments against the Government in the Court of Claims
are in effect declaratory. United States v. Jones, 119 U. S. 477, 7 Sup. Ct. 283 (1SS6);
Ex parte Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co., 285 U. S. 526, 52 Sup. Ct. 392 (1932),
aff'g 73 Ct. CL 447 (1932). See Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace,
288 U. S. 249, 263, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 348 (1933).
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order and expose himself to penalty, but it enables the administra-
tion itself to raise the question of its own powers, when challenged,
without running the risks entailed by precipitate action on the as-
sumption of legality, subsequently established as mistaken.
It is hoped by the present article to indicate the extent to
which the declaratory action has been employed in.the United States
and elsewhere to challenge the validity or interpretation of admin-
istrative action. We shall deal with attacks upon the powers of
administrative bodies or officers, whether raised by affected indi-
viduals or by the government or competing bodies, with the powers
of administrative officials when raised by themselves, with rights
and duties asserted against them, iricluding the right to public
office, with the citizen's privileges and immunities, with the admin-
istration's own claims upon private individuals, with taxation and
its many incidents, and with elections.
PUBLIC POWERS AND DISABILITIES
THE powers of administrative bodies may be brought into ques-
tion either by an individual directly affected, by the Attorney-Gen-
eral acting on behalf of the public at the relation of an aggrieved
party or member of the public, by a taxpayer in many jurisdictions,
or by some other administrative body challenging the jurisdiction or
exercise of powers by the defendant official or board. It will be
observed that in many of the cases one or more of the extraordinary
remedies, such as quo warranto, injunction, mandamus, or certiorari,
would have lain, and it is not unusual to combine injunction or
mandamus with a request for a declaration.
The question of law is submitted in varying forms, depending
somewhat, although not exclusively, upon the goal sought. Occa-
sionally, the issue will suggest the frank doubt and uncertainty of
the petitioner, public or private, who, demonstrating his need for a
declaration, will merely ask for a construction of the statutory
powers of the defendant. The effort is not necessarily to establish
that the defendant is without the power to act as he claims, but to
determine what are his official powers, general or specific, or in
which of two or more bodies a certain power, such as a power of
approval, is vested.2 For example, Yale University, desiring to
'State ex rel. Mellott v. Board of Com'rs of Wyandotte County, 128 Kan. 516,
279 Pac. 1 (1929) (County Attorney against County Commisioners and Treasurer, to
determine defendants' power over the deposit of county funds and their disburse-
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erect an arch across a street in New Haven by which two of its
buildings would be connected, yet fearing to proceed against con-
flicting claims that the structure was not permissible without the
consent of the Board of Aldermen and other administrative bodies,
brought, instead of mandamus for a permit against some selected
official, an action for a declaratory judgment whether the Board of
Aldermen or some other municipal body had the power to permit
the construction or whether the plaintiff 'was privileged to proceed
without special permission.3 Private claimants, for their own se-
curity and protection, occasionally require a declaration of the
powers of a doubting, questioning, or contesting official defendant,
whose activity they invoke.4
In all these cases, as in those to follow, the issue is likely to
turn on a matter of statutory construction; but as the point placed
in issue is the power or disability to perform specific acts or else
the validity or interpretation of administrative action, and only
indirectly the statute itself, the subject may conveniently be here
discussed. Again, instead of challenging the administrative activity
itself, as such, the validity or legality of its result may be the point
in direct issue for declaration, e.g., that public bonds, resolutions,
contracts, notices, etc., are illegal or, if the action is initiated by
ment for public works); Attorney-Geniral ex rel. Ocean Steamship Co. v. Wright, 49
T. L. R. 6 (Ch. 1932) (extent and exercise of statutory price-fixing powers of de-
fendant administrative board, here contended to have been illegally exercised) ; IBiyor
of Wellington v. Wellington City Improvements Loan Sinking Fund Com'rs, 29 N.
Z. 300 (1910) (whether defendants were "trustees" and privileged to invest certain
funds and whether plaintiff privileged to give directions); Public Trustee v. Auckland
Hosp. & Charitable Aid Board, 30 N. Z. 1014 (1911) (whether borrowing powers of
defendant had been abridged by two statutes and what they were and whether it
had power to enter into certain agreement); Mayor of Wellington v. Attorney-General,
33 N. Z. 1458 (1914) (whether Governor's power to designate "roads" applied to
boroughs); Controller & Auditor-General v. Eltham Drainage Dist. Bd., [1919] N. Z.
732 (whether defendant had powers of County Council to pay travelling expenses,
involving statutory construction); Auckland City v. One Tree Hill Borough, [1933]
N. Z. 162 (whether plaintiff or defendant-authority had the right to tax certlin
property on the boundary between them).
'Yale University v. City of New Haven, 104 Conn. 610, 134 Atl. 268 (1926).
The judgment, in addition to declaring that the Board of Aldermen had the power,
also, on request, declared the proposed use reasonable, thus directing or guiding the
Board in its grant of the permit. The advantages of such a clarifying proceeding
over the traditional devices require no comment.
'In re Caldicot & Wentlooge Act, 1884, [19201 2 Ch. 463 (that defendant Com-
missioners had powers which they doubted); John Fuller & Sons v. Mayor of Welling-
ton, 32 N. Z. 41 (1913) (whether defendant could accept the surrender of certain
leases and grant plaintiff new leases, subject to conditions) ; Williamson v. Auckland
Hosp. & Charitable Board, 33 N. Z. 1048 (1914) (whether plaintiff, one of defendant's
lessees, could rely on her old lease, whether later statutes had changed the defendant's
leasing powers, and whether plaintiff could elect the statute upon which reliance
was to be placed).
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the issuing body, legal. The jural relation involved may not always
be clearly stated in the petition, or may be stated in combined or
alternative form that defeats exact classification. For example, the
plaintiff's privilege to act without interference may appear as the
administration's no-right to prevent, e.g., to refuse a permit, or
its duty to grant it. The defendant-commission's activities may be
challenged in the guise of its duties, no-rights, disabilities, or liabili-
ties, or of the plaintiff's rights, privileges, powers, and immunities,
or some combination of these jural relations. The following classi-
fications have usually selected for topical treatment the principal
jural relation involved, and the use of the term "powers" is an alter-
native for jurisdiction and statutory authority.
While the ascertainment of the extent of public powers for
purposes of certainty and security accounts for numerous cases,
especially when instituted by the administration itself, very fre-
quently the issue is raised, in the form of an attack upon, or chal-
lenge of, a power, already exercised or prospective, at private or
public initiative. The challenge may go to the jurisdiction of the
administrative body or to its exercise of functions in general or par-
ticular. In Anglo-American jurisdictions, administrative tribunals
have not yet obtained the authority to issue declarations as such,
though the effect of their ruling is often purely declaratory; but in
several of the states of Germany, such as Wiirttemberg, Baden,
Hamburg, and Bremen, the general power to render declaratory
judgments is vested in administrative courts. In Prussia, Bavaria,
and Saxony, a special power to render declaratory relief is embodied
in certain statutes, relating in the main to disputes arising out of the
care of streets, highways, watercourses, and the delimitation and
distribution of communal burdens of many kinds. There is mani-
fest a growing tendency by statute and decision to expand the power
of administrative tribunals to render declaratory judgments.6
The question whether the administrative authority has or had
jurisdiction over the issue is, as a rule, purely a question of law and
TrAum, DiE FESTSTELLuNGSKLAGE UND n= ZuLAssIoKrr nT DEN VERWALTuNaS-
sTREnTERAHREN PRIEussENs, BAYERNS, SACHSENS, WORTTEMERGS UND BADnS, Dliss.
HEIDELBERG (1926); SEDEL, DiE FESTSTELLUNCSMaAGE nI CIV-UND VERWALTUNOS-
PROZESS (1893). See also Prussia, OBERVERWVALTUNOSGERICUIT (Feb. 20, 1919)1 20 DAB
RECHT no. 304; Hamburg OVG. Dec. 29, 1922, 23 HAxSEAT. RECITSZTO. 196; Prdssha,
78 OVG. 350-351 (Jan. 11, 1923) (enumerating several statutes in which administrativo
courts are authorized to make declaratory judgments). The ruling that theso dcc-
sions are not limited by all the requirements of a declaration under § 256, C.PO, Is
criticized by TRAum, op. cit. supra, at 62 et seq.
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lends itself more readily to speedy determination by declaration than
by the more involved methods of certiorari, injunction, quo war-
ranto, or prohibition. In Australia and New Zealand, the matter
has frequently arisen with respect to the jurisdiction of the arbitra-
tion and conciliation tribunals for industrial disputes, where it is
presented by way of case stated for the opinion of the High Court.
The authority of other boards and commissions has been similarly
questioned. The issues have involved the validity of the constitution
of the court or commission, 6 its jurisdiction over parties7 or subject-
matter,' and its power to undertake specific acts.0 With the rapid
growth in governmental control of industry in the United States, the
necessity for the speedy adjudication of administrative issues be-
tween private industry, labor, and the administration will inevitably
'Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v. J. W. Alexander, Ltd., 2S C. L. R.
(Aust.). 434 (1918) (because President appointed for seven years only).
'Australian Workers' Union v. Adelaide Milling Co., 26 C. L. R. (AusL). 460
(1919) (industrial disputes relating to states); Merchant Service Guild of Austrahisa
v. Commonwealth Steamship Owners' As'n (No. 2), 28 C. L. R.. (AusL). 436 (1920)
(jurisdiction as between plaintiff and various respondents); Federated Seamen's
Union of Australia v. Commonwealth Steamship Owners' A&'n, 30 C. L. R. (Aust.).
144 (1922) (seamen's wages). Cf. Savic v. City of New York, 203 App. Div. 81,
196 N. Y. Supp. 442 (1922) (jurisdiction of state court challenged by foreign consul,
whose exequatur had been withdrawn after alleged crime was committed).
'Federated Municipal & Shire Council Employees' Union v. Lord Mayor of Mlel-
bourne, 26 C. L. R. (Aust.). 508 (1918) (jurisdiction to make award); Federated
Clothing Trades of the Commonwealth of Australia v. Archer, 27 C. L. R. (Aust.).
207 (1919) (whether case involved "industrial dispute"); Federated Gas Employees'
Industrial Union v. Metropolitan Gas Co., 27 C. L. R. (Aust.). 72 (1919) (same;
and whether it had jurisdiction over certain claims); Ince Bros. v. Federated Clothing
& Allied Trade Union, 34 C. L. R. (Aust.). 457 (1924) (same).
'Merchant Service Guild of Australasia v. Commonwealth Steamship Ovners'
Ass'n, 27 C. L. R. (Aust.). 560 (1920) (whether court had power to do more than
fix minimum -wage, etc.); Federated Engine-Drivers' & Finemen's Ass'n v. Adelaide
Chemical & Fertilizer Co., 28 C. L. R. (Aust.). 1 (1920) (power to do certain enumer-
ated acts); Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v. Commonwealth Steamship
Owners' Ass'n, 28 C. L. R. (Aust.). 209 (1920) (power to do certain things with regard
to minimum wage payments); British Imperial Oil Co. v. Federal Com'r of Taxation,
35 C. L. R. (Aust.). 422 (1925) (power of tax Board of Appeal in considering evi-
dence, making assessments and forming independent opinion); Morgan v. Rylands
Bros., 39 C. L. R. (Aust.). 517 (1927) (that certain award was not award of Con-
diation Committee); New Zealand Educational Institute v. Marlborough Ed. Board,
28 N. Z. 1091 (1909) (term of employment of teachers by Board); In re Nev, Zealand
Educational Institute, 30 N. Z. 858 (1911) (authority of Board of Education to exclude
from high schools children below certain standard); Co-operative Fruitgrowers of
Otago v. Central Produce Mart, Ltd., (1918] N. Z. 610 (interpretation of rules of
savings society, concerning power to loan and borrow money); Cunningham v.
Takapuna Tramway & Ferry Co., [1921J N. Z. 22 (interpretation of Order in Council
to construct tramway, validity of delegation to defendant, service to be given, and
making of by-laws); Sarten v. Aotea Dist. Maori Land Board, [1922] N. Z. 5S86
(whether native, by leasing, could render himself landless and board's powers in con-
firming leases); In re Otago & Southland Brick, Tile & Pottery M"akers' Award, [1930]
N. Z. 321 (whether arbitration court could make award as to maximum working
hours beyond those named in statute).
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arise. It might be well to adopt the simplest procedural devices
for bringing such issues to determination, both within the admin-
istrative hierarchy and on appeal to judicial review.
More frequently the question arises on direct attack upon the
exercise of specific powers, either with or without a request for a
restraining order or injunction or other coercive relief, or by assert-
ing the invalidity or illegality of the resulting act as ultra vires.
The complainant may be the individual or corporation, private or
public, immediately affected by the challenged administrative act,
or else a taxpayer as a member of the public, or the attorney-general
as a representative of the public interest. As already observed, the
narrow point raised-may involve and conclusively determine a much
wider issue and will often turn on the construction or interpretation
of a statute.
Administrative boards, commissions, officials, and corporations
have thus been challenged by interested parties with respect to their
power to invade, take, use, or burden the plaintiff's land, 10 to inter-
fere with the plaintiff's business by imposing restrictions,11 to levy or
assess unjustifiable burdens or charges, 12 to do specific acts in exer-
"Genders v. London County Council [1915] 1 Ch. 1 (to take whole property only,
not merely a part); Davies v. Ripon Corp., [19281 Ch. 884 (to lay, maintain, or repair
gas and water pipes); Earl Russell v. Midhurst Rural D. C., 98 L. T. R. 530 (Ch.
1908) (that privilege of taking stone limited and no-right to store materials on land) ;
Ovenstone v. Dundee Dist. Committee, [1919] 2 Scot. L. T. 35 (to take stone from
land for repairing highway); Boland v. Canadian Nat. Ry. Co., 56. Ont. L, Rep. 653
(1925) (to expropriate); Adelaide Corp. v. Attorney-General for South Australia,
45 C. L. R. (Aust.). 517 (1931) (to excavate a certain plot of ground to erect com-
fort station; turned on issue whether plot was a "public street" under statute) ; Ellis
v. Chairman of Hutt County, 29 N. Z. 588 (1910) (to order removal of dam); Smith
v. Attorney-General, 31 N. Z. 509 (1912) (to expropriate); Lillicrap v. Invercargill
City Corp., [1932] N. Z. 734 (to require a certain width for streets, which would
have compelled plaintiff to surrender more land than he wished) ; State Advances Sup't
v. Auckland City Corp., [1932J N. Z. 1709 (to refuse to supply water until condi-
tions met).
'Jewell Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Kemper, 206 Ky. 667, 268 S. W. 324 (1925)
(change of business practices); Dowdy v. City of Covington, 237 Ky. 274, 35 S. W.
(2d) 304 (1931) (registration of moving van operators) ; Peninsular & Oriental Steam
Navigation Co. v. The King, [1901) 2 K. B. 686 (to provide certain accommodations
for lascars); St. James's Hall, Ltd. v. London County Council, 83 L. T. R, 98 (C.
A. 1900) (to serve a second notice to make alterations) ; Jones v. Metropolitan Meat
Industry Board, 37 C. L. R. (Aust.). 252 (1925) (to regulate disposal of offal, fix
prices, etc.).
'Morse v. Ouse Drainage Board, [1931] 1 K. B. 109 (to levy distress on good.
outside defendant's jurisdiction) ; Gresham L. As'ece Soc. v. Attorney-General, [1916]
1 Ch. 228 (tax valuation agreement binding, and no-right to make higher levy) ; New
York L. Ins. Co. v. Public Trustee, (1924] 1 Ch. 15, rev'd, [19241 2 Ch. 101 (to Impolie
charge of confiscation upon proceeds of policies payable by plaintiff to beneficiaries of
insured persons); Baron Reitzes de Marienwert v. Administrator of Austrian Prop-
erty, [19241 2 Ch. 282 (to confiscate his property, claimant alleging himself a citizen
of Poland by place of birth of father); Spooner Oils, Ltd. v. Turner Valley Gas Con-
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cise of their public functions, such as making or altering contracts, a
fixing or reducing salaries or rates,14 refusing permits or licenses,5
and'miscellaneous acts. 6 In many of these cases, an action for
damages might have been possible, especially where contracts were
broken, but in some of these no damages could be immediately estab-
lished, nor were damages as important as rectifying the unlawful
administrative act. Nor is specific performance or injunction readily
granted against the administration, so that the simple declaratory
adjudication of the illegality of the act complained of was the most
assured and effective remedy available.
servation Bd., [19321 4 D. L. R. (Alta.) 729, 750 (to levy taxes for support of board);
Union Steamship Co. of New Zealand v. Minister of Marine, 30 N. Z. 888 (1911)
(to deduct from statutory deposit expenses of maintenance of seamen); Mayor of
Whangarei v. New Zealand State-Guaranteed Advances Office Supt, 33 N. Z. 8$6
(1914) (to increase the rate of interest payable on a loan); Taratahi Dairy Co. v.
Attorney-General, [1917] N. Z. 1 (to make charge on butter-fat as condition of
allowing export of butter and cheese, whether this power could be delegated, etc);
Wellington Livestock Butchers' Ass'n v. Wellington City Corp., [1917] N. Z. 955
(to impose municipal abattoir charges designed to create depredation, -Inking, and
building fund).
'Town of Kearny v. Mayor of City of Bayonne, 90 N. J. Eq. 499, 503, 107 At.
169, 170 (1919) (to enter into contract to supply water to corporations in Kearny.
Power sustained, with remark: "The respondent Bayonne ought not to be permitted to
enter into transactions involving the expenditure of the moneys of the public without
a determination of its challenged rights"); Crediton Gas Co. v. Crediton U. D. C.,
[1928] Ch. 447 (to give notice that contract was terminated, since it is alleged per-
petual) ; Gilleghan v. Minister of Health, [1932] 1 Ch. 86 (to alter the terms of con-
tract between plaintiffs and insurance companies. Petition of right held proper
remedy).
'Davies v. Glamorgan Coal Co., [1913] 3 K. B. 222 (to fix minimum wages
for miners); Portland Cement Mrs. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., [1916] 2 K. B. 262
(to increase railroad rates); Field v. Borough of Poplar, [1929] 1 K. B. 750 (to re-
duce plaintiff's salary) ; Gallagher v. Galway County Council, [1928] Ir. R. 68 (to re-
duce contract salary); Schedlich v. Commonwealth, 38 C. L. R. (Aust.). 518 (1926)
(to reduce plaintiff's salary); Merrington v. Auckland Education Board, [1931] N.
Z. 342 (to fix plaintiff teacher's salary).
'Amos v. Wellington City Corp., [1921] N. Z. 227 (to refuse building permit);
Hardley v. Mount Roskill Road Board, [1923] N. Z. 897 (to refse approval of land
development plan); James v. Waimairi County Council, [1929] N. Z. 449 (to refuse
permit to erect shop oD plaintiffs land under town plan); Jorgenson v. Minister of
Customs, [1931] N. Z. 127 (to refuse brewing license); Lawson v. Minster of Cus-
toms, [19313 N. Z. 656 (to cancel or suspend brewer's license).
"Electrical Development Co. of Ontario v. Attorney-General for Ontario [1919]
1 A. C. 687 (to divert water for water power); Gateshead Union v. Durham County
Council, [19181 1 Ch. 146 (to exclude certain children from school); Hearts of Oak
Ass'ce Co. v. Attorney-General, [19311 2 Ch. 370 (to hold public hearings on plain-
tiff's affairs); Kilwinning Parish Council v. Cunningham Combination Poorhouse Com-
mittee, [1909] 1 Scot. L. T. 205 (to combine certain public offices); Re Land Registry
Act, [1929] 3 D. L. R. (B. C.) 723 (to register conveyance under power of sale in
mortgage); Committee of.Fruit Marketing v. Collins, 36 C. L. R. (Aust.). 410 (1925)
(to hold itself out as sole seller of fruit or to divert fruit to itself); Christchurch
Drainage Board v. District Land Registrar, [1925] N. Z. 842 (to refuse to register
deed). See Kabadian v. Doak, 65 Fed. (2d) 202 (App. D. C. 1933), where the de-
fendant's power to deport plaintiff aliens was attacked by writ of prohibition. This
was denied, because habeas corpus was considered proper. What plaintiffs alone
needed was a declaration of rights, yet they were tripped because they selected the
wrong vehicle for redress.
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The Attorney-General as representative of the public has fre-
quently had occasion to challenge by declaration the validity or
legality of administrative acts. A taxpayer alone in many jurisdic-
tions is not a proper party plaintiff for this purpose1 so that the
law-enforcing officer has generally in English-speaking countries
the authority to challenge, by quo warranto and other extraordinary
remedies but also by the more convenient declaration, the legality
of administrative action. In the few illustrations here cited,
the declaration has been employed to claim the disability to under-
take specific acts, such as carrying on certain types of busines, 1
incurring certain expenses,18 or performing certain acts or func-
tions.19
In most states of the United States, and practically always in
American municipalities, a taxpayer is deemed to have sufficient
legal interest to prevent by injunction the improper or illegal ex-
penditure of public funds, without invoking the actual or pro forma
aid of an attorney-general as party plaintiff. A fortiori, therefore,
he has sufficient interest to request declaratory relief against such
expenditure or activity, whether in the form of a proposed or signed
contract, or otherwise.2" Question may be raised, however, whether,
1 Attorney-General v. Fulham Corp., (1921] 1 Ch. 440 (to carry on a laundry
business) ; Attorney-General v. Liverpool Corp., [1922] 1 Ch. 211 (to carry on busi-
ness of wiring houses); Attorney-General v. City of Leeds, [1929] 2 Ch. 291 (to
run omnibusses beyond city limits; injunction also asked, but refused); Attorney-
General v. Smethwick Corp., [1932] 1 Ch. 562 (to carry on bookbinding busines).1 Whitthorne v. Turner, 155 Tenn. 303, 293 S. W. 147 (1927) (County Judgo
sues to establish invalidity of appropriations increasing County Superintendent's sal-
ary); Attorney-General v. Thomson, [1913] 3 K. B. 198 (to defray expen.es of de-
fending their judgment as compensation authorities); Attorney-General v. Liverpool
Corp., supra note 17 (to use capital for unpermitted business); Attorney-General v.
Merthyr Tydfil Union, [19003 1 Ch. 516 (to establish and maintain relief yards for
able-bodied miners capable of supporting themselves-but injunction denied); At-
torney-General v. Guardians of the Bedwelty Union, 44 Sol. J. 328 (Ch. 1900)
(same); Attorney-General v. Bermondsey Guardians, 40 T. L. R. 512 (Ch. 1924)
(same; jurisdiction held not ousted, although Auditor had charged Guardians with
improper expenditure); Attorney-General v. Poplar Guardians, 40 T. L. R. 752 (Ch.
1924) (same).
"City of Louisville v. Board of Education, 229 Ky. 325, 17 S. W. (2d) 210 (1929)
(to use funds raised "to erect" school-house, to "furnish and equip" it); Attorney-
General v. Shoreditch Corp., [1915] 2 Ch. 154 (to enter into certain lease with de-
fendants); Attorney-General v. Westminster City Council, [19241 1 Ch. 437, aff'd,
[1924J 2 Ch. 416 (to use library building for administrative purposes); Attorney-Gen-
eral v. Sunderland Corp., [1930] 1 Ch. 168 (to provide a parking place for cars at
certain place); Commonwealth v. Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board, 39 C. L.
R. (Aust.) 1 (1926) (that agreement was tra vires and expenditure of capital Im-
proper); Attorney-General ex rel. Cooke v. Wellington City Corp., [1916J N. Z. 981
(to keep a separate account for its tramway expansion).
'Jones v. City of Corbin, 227 Ky. 674, 13 S. W. (2d) 1013 (1929) (validity of
contract for leasing waterworks, to be paid for in certain ways) ; Kirkpatrick v. City
Board of Ed. of Russellville, 234 Ky. 836, 29 S. W. (2d) 565 (1930) (validity of
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
after the project has been begun-when on suit for injunction a more
definite interest in the plaintiff than that of a general taxpayer has
been required 2 "-a taxpayer's declaration is similarly obtainable.
It is believed that the question of "legal interest" is in principle
independent of the form of relief prayed, and that, while the equi-
table conditions of injunctions are not required for a declaration,
there is no reason to suppose that declaratory relief justifies any
modification of the requirements of the forum in the matter of
"legal interest" in the action.
Instead of alleging the disability of the administrative official
to undertake a specific act, it is quite as common for the com-
plainant (victim, attorney-general, or taxpayer) to demand a decla-
ration that the resulting instrument-resolution, regulation, notice,
or order, etc.-is ultra vires and void. The issue will in general in-
volve statutory construction, as in the cases already mentioned.
The attack may go to the corporate resolution as such or, for
example, to a bond issue floated as a consequence,3 or to adminis-
financing plan for school-taxpayer's action); Bridges v..Scott County Bd. of Ed,
235 Ky. 141, 29 S. W. (2d) 594 (1930) (same); Button v. Trimble County Bd. of
Ed., 235 Ky. 771, 32 S. W. (2d) 345 (1930) (validity of school merger); Holman v.
Glasgow Graded Common School Dist., 237 Ky. 7, 34 S. W. (2d) 733 (1931) (valid-
ity of plan for organizing non-profit corporation to build school, to be paid for by
bond issue and liquidated, as means of escaping District's debt limit) ; Godsey v. Board
of Ed. of Ludlow, 238 Ky. 17, 36 S. W. (2d) 656 (1931) (alleged disability to convey
funds to bank as trustee in connection with plan as in preceding ca.e); Lynn v.
Kearney County, 121 Neb. 122, 236 N. W. 192 (1931) (to contract for roads with ad-
joining township); Ward v. Klamath County, 108 Ore. 574, 218 Pac. 927 (1923) (to
contract for courthouse on leased land); Paterson v. Karori Borough, [1917] N. Z.
675 (whether defendant could create a sinking fund for purchase of equipment or
only to service bonds. Apparently taxpayer's action). The interest of a taxpayer
in the proper expenditure of federal moneys is too "minute and indeterminable" to
enable him to raise the issue judicially. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 487,
43 Sup. Ct. 597, 601 (1923).
'Lyons v. School Dist. of Joplin, 311 Mo. 349, 278 S. W. 74 (1925); Richard-
son v. Kildow, 116 Neb. 614, 218 N. W. 429 (1928). The interest of a private citizea
seeklng to oust a public official must be greater than that of a general member of the
public. Newman v. United States ex rel. Frizzell, 238 U. S. 537, 35 Sup. Ct. SSl
(1915) ; Blanchard v. Norman, 164 La. 433, 114 So. 87 (1927).
'Craig, City Comptroller v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 203 App. Div.
412, 203 N. Y. Supp. 236 (1924) (to sell property without plaintiWs assent); Notley
v. London County Council, [ 915J 3 K. B. 580 (to dismiss the plaintiff from office);
Attorney-General v. Guardians of the Poor Law Union of Tynemouth, (1930] 1 Ch.
616 (cancelling debts due to defendants [by taxpayer actually]); Attorney-General v.
Birkenhead Corp., 27 L. G. R. 192, 93 J. P. 33 (Eng. 1929) (resolution void, and
illegal to act upon it); Law v. Ottawa Public School Board, [1928] 4 D. L. R.
(Ont.) 483 (dosing school--taxpayer's suit); Atenata Wharekiri v. Ikaroa Dist.
Maori Land Board, 31 N. Z. 477 (1912) ( to sell land); Karena Rawhi v. Tairawhiti
Dist. Maori Land Board, 32 N. Z. 1 (1913) (confirmation of resolution void); Boyd
v. Mayor of Wellington, [1924] N. Z. 1174 (proclamation vesting plaintiffs land indefendant).dPolard v. City of Norwalk, 108 Conn. 145, 142 At. 807 (1928) (statutory con-
ditions not observed [taxpayer); State ex rel. Baird v. Board of Com'rs of Wyan-
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trative regulations, 24 notices,25 orders,26 or specific acts, such as an
attempted requisition,27 an award,281 agreement,2  sale,30 registra-
tion,31 seizure.2
ADMINISTRATION SEEKS DECLARATION OF ITS OWN DISPUTED
POWER
ADmINISTRATIVE authorities find in the declaration a protection
against mistaken or illegal conduct and against the resulting pen-
dotte County, 117 Kan. 151, 230 Pac. 531 (1924) (county bond void); Coke v.
Shanks, 209 Ky. 723, 273 S. W. 552 (1925) (obligations and warrants issued by de-
fendant highway commissions); Pace v. City of Paducah, 241 Ky. 568, 44 S. W. (2d)
574 (1931) (proposed bond issue [taxpayer]). The issuing authority may of course,
if challenged extrajudicially, sue for a declaration that its bond issue is valid. Fidelity
Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, supra note 1; City of Muskegon Heights v. Danigelig,
253 Mich: 260, 235 N. W. 83 (1931). These declaratory actions are in effect bond
validating suits, which are authorized in certain states, such as California, Florida,
Georgia and Mississippi.
2'China Navigation Co. v. Attorney-General, [1932] 2 K. B. 197 (by which own-
ers were to pay for police protection against pirates); London Ass'n of Shipowners
& Brokers v. London & India Docks Joint Committee, [1892] 3 Ch. 242 (as to loading
ships and use o fdocks); Burkard v. Oakley (Commonwealth Public Trustee), 25 C.
L. R. (Aust.). 422 (1918) (to sell enemy-owned shares); Newcastle & Hunter River
Steamship Co. v. Attorney-General, 29 C. L. R. (Aust.). 357 (1921) (schedules);
Cowan v. Solicitor-General, [1924] N. Z. 108 (promotion of members under Railway
Act).
'Carlton Main Colliery Co. v. Hemsworth R. D. C., [1922] 1 Ch. 521, afj'd, 2
Ch. 609 (notice that plaintiffs were permitting nuisance); Gross, Sherwood & Heald,
Ltd. v. Essex County Council, [1927] 1 Ch. 205 (notice of appointment of succeqor
arbitrator); Hutton v. Attorney-General, [1927] 1 Ch. 427 (military certificate that
taking of plaintiff's land necessary) ; Whyte, Ridsdale Co. v. Attorney-General, (1927]
1 Ch. 548 )Board of Trade notice as to import licenses); New South Wales v. Com-
monwealth (No. 3), 46 C. L. R. (Aust.). 246 (1932) (notices on banks to execute
Act authorizing Commonwealth to pursue funds belonging to delinquent state).
'Arlidge v. Hampstead Metropolitan Borough, [1916J 1 Ch. 59 (closing order);
Zeigler v. City of Victoria, 30 B. C. 389 (1921) (dismissal from fire department);
Cross v. Commonwealth of Australia, 29 C. L. R. (Aust.) 219 (1921) (cancelling com-
mission in army); Bradshaw v. Commonwealth of Australia, 36 C. L, R. (Aust,),
585 (1925) (order retiring plaintiff).
'China Mut. Steam Navigation Co. v. MacLay, [1918] 1 K. B. 33.
'Villeneuve v. Rural Municipality of Kelvington, [1929] 2 D. L. R. (Sask.) 919.
"Anderson v. Commonwealth of Australia, 47 C. L. R. (Aust.) 50 (1932) (sugar
agreement between federal and state government challenged by taxpayer. Dlsmilqcd
for lack of plaintiff's interest, citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, supra note 20). The
administrative body may sue to establish the validity of its challenged contract (Fidel-
ity Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, supra note 1) or the validity or invalidity of
terms or conditions in contracts. See Village of Gross Pointe Shores v. Ayrcs, 254
Mich. 58, 235 N. W. 829 (1931) (validity of conditions placed in deeds to plaintiff by
defendant). So, contractors with administrative bodies, whose contract is challenged,
may, to relieve their uncertainty and proceed with assurance, sue for a declaration
of its validity. Woodward v. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz. 251, 284 Pac. 350(1930).
°Summerland Development Co. v. Corporation of Dist. of Summerland, 40 B. C.
142 (1928) (sale of property for delinquent taxes).
3LAttorney-Genera for New South Wales ex rel. Tooth & Co. v. Brewery Employes
Union, 6 C. L. R. (Aust.) 469 (1908) (registration of workers' trade-marks).
'O'Boyle v. Attorney-General, (1929] Ir. R. 558 (arrest of plaintiff on con-
viction by English court martial); James v. South Australia, 40 C. L. R. (Aust.)
1 (1927) (seizure of plaintiff's fruit).
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alties and attacks. In general, the traditional law compels an offi-
cer to be his own constructionist, and whether he acts, because he
assumes he is lawfully authorized thereto, or fails to act, because
he assumes he is not, he exposes himself to serious risks in either
case, and stakes his security on the accuracy of his guess. This is
neither wise nor sufficient administration, for the public, for the
officer, or for the individual citizen directly affected. While injunc-
tion has offered slight relief for these dilemmas, its scope is limited.
The declaratory judgment shows the way out. It is hardly possible
to measure completely the social advantage accruing from the oppor-
tunity to secure a conclusive adjudication upon contested official
action before rather than after it is undertaken. The conditions oi
justiciability are naturally demanded, to avoid any question of
rendering merely advisory opinions. But the decision when made
between the plaintiff administrative authority, bringing to issue his
own power or privilege to act, and an interested opponent, serves to
clarify the legal position and averts the danger of incurring a crim-
inal penalty, dismissal, or an action in tort, and the deleterious pub-
lic consequences of wrongful official acts.
Perhaps the most frequent occasion for obtaining the pro-
tection of a judicial determination of the validity of proposed admin-
istrative action lies in connection with the raising and spending of
public money. Leaving aside for the moment the problems involved
in the exertion of the taxing power, usually brought to issue by the
affected taxpayer, administrative authorities have found it exceed-
ingly helpful to raise promptly the disputed question of their statu-
tory power to borrow money, including the legal conditions of a
loan, or to spend money. Thus, the power to issue bonds for special
purposes, the use and disposition of funds in particular ways, the
chargeabilty of the expenditure to particular appropriations, and
the conditions of spending have frequently been the subject of
declaratory action. Again, the power to regulate public property
is often adjudicated. Officials contemplating arrests, levies, and
other invasions of privacy have found it useful to adjudicate their
privilege before rather than after the invasion. The administration's
power to demolish or erect buildings, to sell or lease or otherwise
deal with private property, or exercise other privileges is occasionally
raised by declaration. The administration sometimes preferg to
initiate proceedings determining its power to dismiss or transfer its
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employees. In all these cases, the exceptional advantages of decla-
ratory relief will be readily apparent.
The borrowing power often needs advance determination be-
cause of statutory limitations on indebtedness and on the purposes
for which loans may be raised and because the validity of any re-
sulting bond or promise to pay depends upon an exact compliance
with the technical requirements of the law. Thus, issue has been
raised, especially under the wide powers of the New Zealand Act,
as to the conditions and terms of borrowing33 and the purposes of
borrowing'
In the expenditure of money, detailed questions of authority
arise, questions which mtest, if trouble is to be avoided, be decided
before the expenditure is undertaken. The issues may relate to
questions of the use of funds for particular purposes, 8 matters of
auditing or charging expenditures against special funds or appropria-
tions,36 the allocation of costs between different authorities, 7 and
'In re Gore Borough Council, 29 N. Z. 192 (1910) (to borrow without calling
election); Mayor of Invercargill v. Walker, 32 N. Z. 628 (1913) (to borrow certain
sum without notice or further poll); In re McCarthy; 34 N. Z. 930 (1915) (to make
advances and borrow money without court order); Gisborne Borough v. Auckland
Prey. Patriotic & War 'Relief Ass'n., [1916] N. Z. '218 (whether, after getting auth-
ority for thirty-year loan, plaintiff could contract for ten-year loan, on which lender
insisted); Takapuna Borough v. Australian Mut. Provident Soc., [19163 N. Z. 296
(whether authority to borrow had been properly obtained and whether defendant
could safely lend) ; 'Pukekohe Borough v. Bank of New Zealand, [1916] N. Z. 926
(to borrow on overdraft).
uTaradale Town Board v. Australian Mut. Prov. Soc., 30 N. Z. 733 (1911) (to
erect buildings for public reading room); Mayor of Gisborno v. Australian Mut.
Prov. Soc., 31 N. Z. 972 (1912) (to reinstate waterworks and build other public
works); Tauranga Borough v. Bank of New Zealand, [1916] N. Z. 233 (to repay
overdraft); Napier Borough v. Australian Mut. Prov. Soc., [1917) N. Z. 292 (same;
involving question whether borrowing powers exceeded); Mayor of Napler v. Aus-
tralian Mut. Prov. Soc., 31 N. Z. 1113 (1912) (same); Victoria Univ. College Coun-
cil v. Attorney-General, (1926] N. Z. 135 (to erect memorial windows for war
dead).
'City of Louisville v. Board of Education, 229 Ky. 325, 17 S. W. (2d) 210 (1929)
(whether board may use funds raised "to erect" schoolhouse, to furnish and equip);
Petition of Dunmore School Dist., 25 Lack. Jur. 170, 38 York Leg. Rce. 80 (Pa.
1924) (to use bond-money to pay teachers' salaries); In re Jenkins Township Firo
Truck, 25 Luz. Leg. Reg. Rep. 144 (Pa. 1928) (to repair fire truck out of now
funds, beyond statutory limit for fire protection); Woodside's Petition, 77 Pittsb.
Leg. J. (0. S.) 8 (Pa. 1928) (that expense of audit by plaintiff county comptroller
was legal); In re Waganni Boro. Council Tramways Extension Special Loan, [19223
N. Z. 500 (whether funds raised for eight purposes could be expended for les3 than
eight); Tauranga Boro. Corp v. Attorney-General, [19273 N. Z. 875 (whether two
shops could be erected as integral part of library, for which loan was raised),
'State Highway Com'n v. Coleman, 236 Ky. 444, 33 S. W. (2d) 318 (1930)
(Commission against Auditor, to determine debits on appropriations and financing of
Commission); The Oregon, the Cairnsmore and the Gunda, [19211 P. 224 (Ex-
chequer seeks declaration whether sums paid for wrongful seizure and premiums,
on insurance were chargeable to Naval Prize Fund); The Adolph, [1920] P. 333
(same; for necessaries, towage, dock dues, wages, etc.); Mayor of Wellington v.
Attorney-General, 32 N. Z. 1175 (1913) (whether interest earned on loan fund was
part of capital or usable for interest and other service charges on loan).
'Waller v. Union County, 223 Ky. 636, 4 S. W. (2d) 414 (1928) (county sum3
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questions of form and classification 8 Whereas issues directly chal-
lenging statutes are not here discussed,39 the questions presently
considered place more directly in issue the validity and extent of
administrative authority thereunder, raised by the official body
itself.
Administrative officers often have occasion to assert or to ques-
tion their power to make payments of a particular kind, under
special conditions4' or to certain persons; 4 ' to demand or require
taxes, rates, fees, deposits, or other money;' and to control the
-road commissioners to determine which authority must pay for rights of way, and
-whether county bond proceeds available); Oroua Land Drainage Board v. Sluggish
River Drainage Board, 32 N. Z. 802 (1913) (financial obligations of each district
for obligations of old one from which they had been formed); Bruce County v.
Lakes Drainage Dist., [1918] N. Z. 806 (whether costs of erecting new canal, instead
of repairing old one, could be thrown on defendant); Waimairi County v. Paparua
County, [1919] N. Z. 85 (apportionment of costs in "maintaining" road).
'City of Chester v. Woodward, 13 D. & C. 201 (Pa. 1929) (whether improvement
bonds issued based on special assessments was "incurring" or "increasing" indebted-
mess, requiring approval of certain administrative official. See opinion of Fox, J,
and note, at 203: "Considerable delay may be caused in the various steps of certifi-
cation and appeal as provided for in the Act of 1927 .... Avoidance of delay
is within the spirit of the (declaratory judgments] act. It is important to the many
municipalities within the Commonwealth to have this controversy decided at an early
date!').
'These cases will be discussed elsewhere.
'-West Midlands Joint Electricity Authority v. Pitt, [1932J 2 K. B. 1 (plaintiffs'
power to determine method of compensation to defendant for rights of way); In re
Australian Metal Co., Ltd., 33 C. L. R. (Aust.) 329 (1923) (whether certain claim-
ants against company under alien property sequestration were entitled to interet);
Wellington City Corp. v. Compton, [1916J N. Z. 779 (validity of street plan and
defendant landowner's right to obtain compensation); Auckland Harbour Board v.
Rex, [11919] N. Z. 419 (duty to pay for land taken, without deduction for payments
to lessee).
'Graham v. England, 154 Tenn. 435, 288 S. W. 728 (1926) ; State ex tel Barham v.
Graham, 161 Tenn. 557, 30 S. W. (2d) 274 (1930) (comptroller of state, not kno.7-
ing to which of three competing judges to pay salary of office, sued for declaration
of his duty, thus obtaining protection against erroneous payment); Wimbledon &
Putney Commons Conservators v. Tuely, [1931J 1 Ch. 190 (plaintiffs' power to
pay future pensions to different classes of employees, which would affect amount of
taxes to be levied. Defendants, representative of taxpayers); Wellington Harbour
Board v. Solidtor-General, 31 N. Z. 1008 (1912) (whether plaintiff could make
provision for retiring allowances of special employees).
'Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Co. v. City of Morehead, 223 Ky. 698, 4 S. W. (2d)
726 (1928) (a contractor had refused to proceed with public improvements until the
city's power to levy an essessment on Railroad had been made dear. Railroad had
dedicated land to city and claimed future tax exemption, whereupon city sued for
declaration); Lewis, Sec. of State v. Oscar C. Wright Co., 234 Ky. 814, 29 S. W.
(2d) 566 (1930) (whether plaintiff may permit filing of amended articles of incor-
poration, authorizing issue of no-par stock and allocation of proceeds of sale as
directors decide); Johnson City v. Clinchfield R. R. Co., 163 Tenn. 332, 43 S. W.
(2d) 386 (1931) (whether taxes were collectible in district annexed by statute); Ford
Shipping Line, Ltd. v. Superintendent of Mercantile Marine, 29 N. Z. 679, 635
(1910) (deposit for medical expenses of seamen. Suit by shipping line to recover.
Dictum: "The question appears .. . to be one of those in which the Marine De-
partment might well consider the advisability of obtaining concdusive adjudication
under the... Declaratory Judgments Act, 190"); Wellington Harbour Ferries v.
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distribution or deposit of public funds.43 The power to contract
obligations4" and to limit or ascertain their extent4 is occasionally
placed in issue by a city or administrative authority.
Administrative officials not infrequently seek a declaration of
their challenged power to regulate particular industries or prop-
erty46 and, in order to escape the consequences of mistake, to take
action cutting off private rights, such as the sale of land or per-
sonalty for delinquent taxes,47 the power to take land for alleged
Wellington Harbour Board, 29 N. Z. 729 (1910) (to make distinctions as to fees
payable by ferries using various routes and wharves) ; Mayor of Wellington v. Attor-
ney-General, 33 N. Z. 392 (1913) (whether plaintiff could recover money due under
tax statute; whether instalments so recoverable); Southland Elec. Power Board v.
Attorney-General, [1926] N. Z. 408 (plaintiff's power to levy special taxes without
regard to benefit, and without describing boundaries of property ass eed).
"'Waihemo County Council v. Auditor-General, [1921] N. Z. 233 (proper distribu-
tion of fees between tax district and county); Auckland City Sinking Funds Com'ra
v. Mayor of Auckland, [1922] N. Z. 48 (proper distribution of sinking fund);
Huntly Town Board v. Registrar of Supreme Court of New Zealand, [1924) N. Z.
897 (distribution of proceeds of sale of property sold for non-payment of taxes);
In re Application of School Dist. of Steelton, 31 Dauph. Co. Rep. 75 (Pa. 1927)
(whether statutory limitations of deposits in single depositary applied to sinking fund
of district). See Kan. Acts 1933, c. 164, § 4, providing that county treasurer, beforo
prorating back to taxing districts amounts tied up in closed banks, shall seek a
declaratory judgment against all the taxing districts determining the amount due,
"Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, supra note 1 (action by city to estab-
lish validity of special assessment and improvement bonds issued thereunder); City
of Sturgis v. Christenson Bros. Co., 235 Ky. 346, 31 S. W. (2d) 386 (1930) (whether
subsequent statute prevented the issue of bonds as planned); City of Muskegon
Heights v. Danigelis, supra note 23 (validity of bonds for relief of the destitute).
'Hadham Rural D. C. v. Crallan, [1914] 2 Ch. 138 (that plaintiff was privileged
to refuse to supply water beyond amount agreed when contract was concluded);
In re Dieckman, [19181 1 Ch. 331 (comptroller of leased enemy property seeks, after
liquidation, to determine whether there are any obligations which lesor could
under lease require of him in future); Manchester Corp. v. Audenshaw U. D. C.,
[1928] Ch. 127 (that they were bound only to maintain road in condition of repair
for traffic in 1878, when statute passed, and not in condition to sustain modern
traffic. No other remedy here available to plaintiffs); Broadview v. Saskatchewan
Co-op. Creameries, [1928] 1 D. L. R. (Sask.) 1119 (plaintiff town seeks declaration
that it is not obliged to furnish defendant electric power under contract, as It was
-dtra vires); In re Australian Metal Co., 29 C. L. R. (Aust.) 347 (1921) (Comp-
troller of Enemy Property sues to determine whether a certain claim against his
controlled liquidated firm should be admitted by him); Mayor of Karori v. Aus-
tralian Mut. Prov. Soc., 30 N. Z. 438 (1911) (whether bond form could be changed
by mayor, after election); Petone Borough v. Lower Hutt Borough, [19181 N. Z.
844 (whether city could vary contract price owing to increased rates).
"cTruro Corp. v. Rowe, [1901J 2 K. B. 870, rev'd, [1902] 2 K. B. 709 (to regulate
oyster fisheries and lease land, and to nullify defendant's alleged customary privilege of
user. Trespass sued for, but only declaration given); Port of London Authorltv v.
Cairn Line of Steamships, Ltd., [19131 1 K. B. 497 (that plaintiffs have sole privi-
lege of weighing and measuring grain discharged on certain docks. Injunction also
asked, but refused, because the court "had no doubt that the defendants would
comply with the declaration"); Thames Conservators v. Kent, [1918] 2 K. B. 272
(plaintiff's power to regulate and restrict the use of towpaths); Attorney-General v,
Sewell, 88 L. J. K. B. 425 (1919) (certain promenade was a public highway);
Preston Corp. v. Pyke, [1929] 2 Ch. 338 (control of burial ground, involving con-
struction of deeds); Magistrates of Edinburgh v. Officers of State, 4 S. 319 (Scot.
1825) (declarator of magistrates' jurisdiction under Crown charter).
'State ex rel. Milwaukee County v. City of Milwaukee, 246 N. W. 447 (Wis. 1933)
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public purposes,4 to demolish or remove private buildings,"" to
enter upon land,"0 seize property,51 levy execution,5 2 arrest a delin-
quent person,5 or commit other acts 4 which, if not sanctioned as
valid, would entail serious consequences for the mistaken official.
The power to undertake public works, enter into contracts, or
carry on enterprises of various kinds 5 is frequently placed in issue,
not only by a taxpayer or other challenger, but by the administrative
authority itself.
(power to make tax sale on certain date); Mitchell v. Hayes, [1926] N. Z. 262
(registrar's power to make further sales of lots, although tax lien satisfied by sale
of two, in order not to compel two mortgagees to bear entire burden); Devonport
Borough Council v. Quartley, [1930] N. Z. 884 (whether registrar could sell certain
land for taxes).
'Johnsonville Town Board v. Futter, 30 N. Z. 490 (1911) (to take land out of
,plaintiff's district and erect a septic tank system); Smith v. Attorney-General, 31
N. Z. 509 (1912); Solidtor-General v. Cave, 31 N. Z. 614 (1912); Attorney-General
cx tel. Waitotara County v. Reid, [1920] N. Z. 563 (to appropriate land as "road,"
and that intention to take had not been abandoned).
'Ruislip-Northwood U. D. C. v. Lee, 145 L. T. R. 203 (K. B. 1931) (to demolish
certain structures as "temporary buildings" under statute); Devonport Corp. v.
Tozer, [1902] 2 Ch. 182 (injunction that defendant remove structures on alleged
Idghway, or declaration that plaintiffs privileged to remove; special statutory tribunal
-deemed to have jurisdiction).
Mayor of London v. Homer, 111 L. T. R. 512 (C. H. 1914) (to enter and take
possession of leased market, after notice) ; Brodrick v. Blackie, 34 N. Z. 1113 (1915)(right of drainage board to deal with gravel on defendant's property).
'The King v. The "Mary C. Fischer", [1929] 4 D. L. R. (B. C.) 679 (customs
officials had seized, for alleged violation of Customs Act, vessel which had drifted
into Canadian waters helpless after storms at sea, and sought declaration of validity
of seizure. Held, for defendant); Secretary of State of Canada v. Alien Property
-Custodian for U. S., [1930J 3 D. L. R. (Can. Ex. Ct) 81, aff'd, [1931] 1 D. L. P.
(Can. S. C.) 890 (Canadian Custodian of Enemy Property's right to seize German-
owned stock on books of Canadian companies, as against United States Custodian's
seizure of physical certificates and their transfer on transfer books kept in Nev.
York).
mAronowitz v. Industrial Utilities Corp., 5 D. & C. 633 (Pa. 1925) (defendant
sheriff seeks declaration whether he is privileged to levy execution as demanded by
plaintiff judgment-creditor).
'Huber, Tax Collector v. Weakland, 7 D. & C. 496 (Pa. 1925) (doubtful of his
power to arrest, after finding no property on which to levy school tax, plaintiff
seeks declaration); The Countess, [1921] P. 279, af'd, [1922] P. 41 (to detain a
ship until certain charges were paid).
"Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board v. Federated Seamen's Union, 36 C.
I,. R. (Aust.) 442 (1925) (to have defendant's regitmration as an employee organiza-
tion cancelled).
'Mansfield Boro. School Dist. v. Mansfield High School As'n, 9 D. & C. 113
(Pa. 1926) (that plaintiffs privileged to rent a school building for forty years);
Port of London Authority v. Cairn Line of Steamships, Ltd., supra note 46 (sole
privilege to weigh and measure grain on certain docks); West Midlands Joint
Electricity Authority v. Pitt, [1932J 2 K. B. 1 (to maintain electric lines); The
King v. Paulson, 15 Ex. C. R. 252 (Can. 1914) (that mining leases had been validly
.cancelled); Commonwealth & Central Wool Committee v. Colonial Combing, Spin-
ning & Weaving Co., 31 C. L. R. (Aust.) 421 (1922) (executive powers to make
contracts and with whose approval); Mayor of Miramar v. The King, 28 N. Z.
727 (1909) (power to construct and lease tramways) ; Manukau Water-Supply Board
v. Attorney-General, 29 N. Z. 438 (1910) (to erect certain buildings) ; Mayor of North-
East Valley v. Attorney-General, 29 N. Z. 106S (1910) (to unite two boroughs into
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
156 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW
The power to appoint, transfer, and retire its own employees"0
may be raised by the employing administrative board as a method
of averting a contest with other authorities or a suit for damages
or other sanction by the aggrieved employee.
PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC DUTIES
IT has already been observed that in an action against the
Government or an administrative department for money or other
property or to establish rights of other kinds, a declaration serves
the same purpose as coercive relief, for when an adjudication of
an administrative duty has been obtained, it is rarely conceivable
that coercion to compel performance of that duty is required. Hence,
the practice is growing of impleading the administration by decla-
ratory .suit to establish rights against it. This procedure has, in
fact, made inroads upon 'the doctrine that the Crown in British
jurisdictions can be sued only by petition of right,"1 for in ever
larger measure the subject has been enabled to secure a declaration
of the Crown's statutory powers and duties. The only limitation
is that actions to declare the subject's right to damages or to prop-
erty have been closely watched, so as not to permit declaratory
relief to usurp the primary functions of a petition of right or to
escape its necessity in contract cases. Yet the increasing number
of statutes permitting suit in tort against the Government 8 may
in time reduce the scope of the petition of right and enlarge the
scope of declaratory relief, for restrictions on suit in contract can
hardly be justified when those in tort have been lifted.
one); Otago Boys' & Girls' High School Board v. Murray, 30 N. Z. 799 (1911)
(power to accept surrender of old lease and grant new lease); New Zealand Meat-
Producers Board v. Attorney-General, [1927J N. Z. 851 (power to purchase land,
to erect stores, mortgage, etc.); Hauraki Drainage Board v. Bank of New Zealand,
[1928] N. Z. 59 (to carry on drainage projects by raising loan).
'Christchurch Tramway Board v. Christchurch Tramway Employees' Industrial
Union, [1931] N. Z. 543 (to appoint under statute, without control of Council of
Conciliation, etc.); Wanganui Education Board v. Bowater, (1916] N. Z. 590 (to
transfer teacher to different position with same salary); Auckland Education Board
v. Shepherd, [19311 N. Z. 945 (to dismiss married teachers already in servico and
not merely new teachers); Board of Ed. of Detroit v. Campbell, 256 Mich. 390,
239 N. W. 370 (1931) (to retire a teacher on pension, although a veteran).
"'See cases infra notes 118, 119.
'See CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 1714 1/2 (Stat. 1931, p. 168); CoNn.
GEN. STAT. (1930) §§ 5988, 5989; Mich. Pub. Acts 1929, no. 259, p. 621; Min. STAT.
(Mason, 1931) §§ 1920-1, 1920-2; Wis. STAT. (1931) § 66.095; N. Y. C. Local Law 13
(1927), sustained in Evans v. Berry, City Comptroller, 262 N. Y. 61, 186 N. E. 203
(1933); and following articles: Borchard, The Federal Tort Claims Bill (1933) 1
U. OF Cnic. L. REv. 1; Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924-5) 34 YArLL L.
J. 1, 129, 229; Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1928) 28 Cot. L. RMv. 577,
734; Borchard, Tort Liability of the State (1930) 12 J. Soc. ComP. LEo, AND IN,
LAW 1.
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The right to the return of deposited money or to compensation
for breach of contract or in quasi-contract or tort has occasionally
been pursued by declaratory action, with varying, but, on the
whole, useful, results. These included claims for reimbursement
of losses sustained through governmental inaction or delinquency,
or for reimbursement of money erroneously paid to, or expended
on behalf of, the administration.59 Probably the most effective
'Burnham v. Bennett, 141 Misc. 514, 517, 252 N. Y. Supp. 788, 793 (1931)
(plaintiff, whose land had been e-xpropriated for a park and who had secured a
judgment against the state, found that the funds appropriated for these e.xpropria-
tions were exhausted. She did not enter judgment on appeal, as interest would
cease to run in 30 days. State officers contended the judgment was therefore
defective, and she sought declaration of her rights. The court remarked: "Plain-
tiff demands a declaratory judgment defining her rights. She contends that manda-
mus is not an adequate remedy as she must enter her judgment to bring mandamus
and thus, after thirty days, and during the litigation which would necessarily ensue,
due to the attitude of the officials of the state, she would lose her interest. This
is not in effect an action against the state. Rolston v. Missouri Fund Com'rx, 120 U. S.
390, 7 S. Ct. 599, 30 L. Ed. 721. I think plaintiff may have her rights defined before
she enters her judgment, so that she may collect her award, without Jos of interest!';
Hosier Bros. v. Earl of Derby, [1918] 2 K. B. 671 (plaintiff sought declaration that
he was entitled to compensation for use of machinery leased to Crown, improper
under terms of the lease, and other declarations construing the contract. Action
not maintainable against servant of Crown; only remedy petition of right); Bombay
& Persia Steam Navigation Co. v. MlacLay, [1920) 3 K. B. 402 (plaintiffs sought
declaration that they were entitled to compensation for losses arising under certain
war regulations and assessment of amount. Declaration denied in absence of statute
making defendant liable); Elsdon v. Hampstead Corp., [1905] 2 Ch. 633 (plaintiffs,
owners of houses abutting on G Gardens, sought declaration that resolution revisin.g,
apportionment of paving expenses was invalid, injunction, and repayment of funds.
When the original apportionment was made, S property was included as benefited;
but -when holders of S property objected, defendant accepted their view and passed
the new resolution. Declaration granted, with liberty to apply for injunction and
repayment); Plean Colliery Co. v. Stirlingshire County Council, [1931] S. C. Scot.
117 (plaintiff claimed dedarator that, not having recovered from rents a named
proportion of the occupiers' rates paid by it, it was entitled to repayment under
certain statutory provisions. Issue arose because some of the houses were unoc-
cupied and because some of the rents were not paid in full); O'Donoghue v. Roche,
[1927J Ir. R. 152 (plaintiff sought declaration that he was entitled to return of
deposit, injunction, and orders. Under statute, candidates for Parliament were
required to deposit 1150 with defendant, pending election returns. L and G had
made the deposit on plaintiff's behalf and the money had been returned to them);
Qu'Appelle Long Lake & Saskatchewan R. R. & Steamboat Co. v. The King, 7 Ex.
C. R. 105 (Can. 1901) (petition of right based on an alleged breach of contract
for a grant by the Crown. Crown was ready to make the grant, but issue arose
as to whether the lands designated satisfied the purpose. Granted) ; linister for
Home and Territories v. Lazarus, 26 C. L. R. (Aust.) 159 (1919) (special case to
determine which of two dates was to be used in fixing value of land for compan a-
tion); Weldon v. Smith, 34 C. L. R. (Aust.) 29 (1924), rev'g 30 C. L. R. (Aust.)
34 (1922) (plaintiff claimed declaration that he was entitled to compensation for
losses occasioned by defendant's negligence. Defendant administrative officer was
charged with storing -wheat. Denied, because government bad not assumed degree
of care suffident to charge it); Smith v. William Charlick, Ltd., 34 C. L. R. (Aust.)
38 (1924) (plaintiff asked repayment declaration that government was not entitled
to surcharge or retention of certain sum, and account. Plaintiff had contracts for
sale of wheat by government at various prices and had received delivery. When
'government changed price under statutory authority, plaintiff paid only when
threatened with discontinuance of business. Denied on appeal); Nott Bros. & Co.
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way for an officer to sue for his salary 0 or for his pension"' or for
compensation for particular services rendered, including the method
of determining it, 2 is by declaration. In these cases it serves merely
v. Barkley, 36 C. L. R. (Aust.) 20 (1925) (plaintiffs caused a special case to be
stated to determine whether they were entitled to repayment of duty paid on
artificial flowers imported from France, duty having been levied under statutes);
Hume Steele, Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Victoria, 39 C. L. R. (Aust.) 455 (1927)
(summons by lessees to determine whether they could, on resumption of land by
the Crown, recover compensation for five types of losses, in view of lease stipulations) ;
Beauchamp-Platts v. Budgett, 33 N. Z. 1502 (1914) (plaintiff receiver sought declara-
tion construing statutory provisions as to destitute persons. Defendant had not
paid sums due on maintenance order issued against him. He had funds in the
hands of the Public Trustee which plaintiff wished to reach).
'Lewis v. Coleman, 233 Ky. 266, 25 S. W. (2d) 390 (1930) (plaintiff Secretary
of State sought declaratory judgment fixing the amount of salary due. Defendant
Auditor contended that a certain statute repealed the former provision and reduced
it); Easton Councilmen's Salaries, 8 D. & C. 752 (Pa. 1926) (plaintiff officers sought
declaration fixing their salaries. Defendant Comptroller contended that salaries were
fixed by 1923, not 1925, ordinance); Stevens v. Hampstead Boro Council, t19291
2 Ch. 239 (plaintiff sued for "full regular pay," alleging it included all war raiseg.
Defendant by way of counterclaim asked declaration that it meant pay as of time
of enlistment. Declaration granted defendant); Macdonald v. The, Xing, (19301
3 D. L. R. (Manit.) 465 (plaintiff sought declaration, on petition of right, fixing
salary due him. Issue was term of office-life or period for which appropriations
were made); Leyden v. Attorney-General of the Irish Free State, [1926) Ir. R,
334 (plaintiff teacher sought declaration that an arbitral award was binding on
defendant and that she was entitled to certain pay, a 1923 order being invalid.
Salary differences were arbitrated 1917-20. After transfer to Free State jurisdiction
in 1923, a reduction was ordered. Granted); Woods v. Dublin Corp., [19311 Irn R,
396 (plaintiff nurses sought declarations fixing right to certain rate of pay. Isso
turned on validity of changes made in hospital charter and a 1926 reduction order);
McDougall v. Attorney-General, (1925] N. Z. 104 (plaintiff railway employee sought
declaration fixing his right to certain rate of pay. Denied because Crown not bound
by declaration and plaintiff had relief under special statutes); Merrington v. Auck-
land Education Board, [1931J N. Z. 342 (plaintiff teacher sought declaration fixing
salary, due him in a position to which he was transferred, under statutes).
'Hammond v. London County Council, [19311 1 Ch. 540 (plaintiff sought declara.
tion that a certain term should be included in computing his pension. Thig term
bad been spent in acting as substitute for man in service) ; Cahill v. Attorney-Gen-
eral, [1925] 1 Ir. R. 70, 64 Ir. L. T. 55 (1930) (plaintiff police officers sought
declarations of their rights to pay, promotion, and pension under the treaty
between Great Britain and Ireland. Issue turned on meaning of "officer" and "ten-
ure") ; Byrnes v. Limerick County Council, [1932) Ir. R. 653 (plaintiff clerk claimed
declaration that he was entitled to certain superannuation allowance. He had retired
for ill health in 1925. Defendant claimed that his rights were regulated by 1927
resolution. Granted) ; Attorney-General for Victoria v. Roberts, 46 C. L. R. (Aust.)
1 (1931) (plaintiff teacher sought declaration that he was entitled to pension under
certain statute. Issue turned on plaintiff's status during a certain period); Racits-
GEICET III (July 10, 1914) 190-4; SOoEiRG, RECIITSPRECHUNO (1915) 482 (declara-
tion permitted to establish that plaintiff had claimed pension in due time); 92 RG.
377 (April 12, 1918) (action for widow's pension-executory as to amounts due,
declaratory as to future. Declaratory action allowed, because there could be no
execution against the Reich); 129 RG. 31 (May 13, 1930) (grammar school teacher
sued Prussia for declaration as to term used in fixing his pension. Declaratory
action allowed under benevolent interpretation); 133 RG. 313 (Sept. 29, 1931)(plaintiff municipal officer, who had renounced pension rights on retiring, sought
declaration that he could not renounce his rights as a public officer and that the
renunciation took place during mental illness. Granted).
'Wire v. Board of Com'rs of Edwards County, 131 Kan. 725, 293 Pac. 753 (1930)
(plaintiff sheriff sought declaration fixing compensation for serving warrants. Issue:
compensation for actual mileage traveled or distance of points from county seat);
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as an alternative to coercive relief and accomplishes the same pur-
pose. But occasionally, it performs a more valuable function in
enabling an officer to assert his claim to salary or pension, when
he contemplates some action which might deprive him of it, per-
mitting him thus to place in issue his alternative rights and to avoid
a possibly fatal step by securing an adjudication upon its effect
before actually embarking upon it. Thus, Judge Criswell, having
been retired on statutory pay but under a covenant with the Audi-
tor-General that he would hold himself in readiness to perform
certain judicial duties until his death, desired to enter practice with-
out losing his rights under the compensation statute. Proving the
seriousness and imminence of his plan, he sought, against the Audi-
tor who claimed that his pension would be forfeited, a declaration
that he retained his status as a retired judge and his pension or,
in the alternative, that it was suspended only during actual prac-
tice, as the court in fact decided.' The light was turned on, and
the leap in the dark made unnecessary. The right to poor relief,"
to claim money collected by the state,65 or to revalorize public
bonds66 has been successfully invoked by suits for declarations.
The right to specific relief, such as a land grant,", a patent,6s
City of Corbin v. Underwood, 221 Ky. 413, 298 S. W. 109D (1927) (plaintiff jailer
claimed declaration of his rights to reimbursement for expenses of transporting and
guarding prisoners for trial, in view of certain statutes); Nichols v. Board of Educa-
tion of Danville, 232 Ky. 428, 23 S. W. (2d) 607 (1930) (plaintiff, clerk of county
court, sought declaration fixing his right to compensation for making out tax bills
for defendant); Hawkins v. Fiscal Court of Caldwell County, 233 Ky. 432, 25 S.
W. (2d) 1015 (1930) (plaintiff peace officers sought declaration fixing their right
to fees for arrests under prohibition statute in cases in which the fine was worked
out in street labor, defendant having refused them in such cases); Moore v. Moore,
147 Va. 460, 137 S. E. 488 (1927) (mandamus to compel issuance of rarrant, com-
pensating plaintiff for work under statute regulating inheritance taxes. Court held
that declaratory judgment procedure was available, because statutory construction
was involved); Millar v. Rex, 49 Ont. L. Rep. 93 (1921) (petition of right to
recover compensation for services rendered in connection with a purchase, which
was regulated by statute. Issue: title searching unnecessary); Auckland Gas Co.
v. Auckland City Corp., [1922J N. Z. 1041 (plaintiff sought declaration fixing its
right to compensation for concreting roads. When defendant paved streets, plaintiff
voluntarily moved its pipes from the road to the sidewalks in order to render
access easier).
'Criswell v. Martin, 8 D. & C. 425 (Pa. 1926).
'O'Connor v. Dwyer, [1932] Ir. R. 466 (although the court refused to ffi the
amount. Appelate court reversed, on ground that administrative officer's discretion
should not be reviewed, unless lack of bona fides).
12 RG. 388 (Oct. 28, 1884) (that plaintiff orphan asylum has right under early
charter to penalties collected by defendant administrative officers).
'RG. March 30, 1931, 60 JuR. Wocn.scHl. 2483; RG. May 18, 1931, ibid. at
3263.
'Fitzpatrick v. Rex, 57 Ont. L. Rep. 178 (1925) (denied on merits).
"WTharton v. Registrar of Patents, [1921] N. Z. 817.
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or a certificate from a public utility commission,9 has been asserted
by declaratory action. In the last case, the advantage of such relief
was demonstrated in the fact that the commission refused to issue
such a certificate except upon compliance with a condition-a cov-
enant in advance to charge only certain rates, unreviewable as
such-which the utility considered illegal. Instead of incurring the
dangers of proceeding without the certificate or the disadvantages
of complying with the alleged illegal exaction, the plaintiffs were
able to secure an adjudication of their right to the certificate, the
invalidity of the regulations being determined before rather than
after their enforcement. In other cases, the right to the delivery
of jewelry, withheld by the police on a contested claim for charges,70
the right to a supply of water under named conditions,"1 the right
to the renewal of a franchise or to undertake specific acts, if
necessary at defendant's expense, 73 have all been adjudicated by
declaration.
While right and duty are correlative terms, the issue between
the individual and the administration is quite commonly presented
in the form of a demand for a declaration of the administration's
duty to maintain or repair public works, such as bridges, roads,
watercourses, drains, etc., 74 or to do specific acts, such as to accept
'Tennessee Eastern Elec. Co. v. Hannah, 157 Tenn. 582, 12 S. W. (2d) 312
(1928) (defendant unsuccessfully contended that Chancery Court had no jurisdiction
in declaratory action to determine validity of regulations).
'Peoples' Credit Jewelers, Ltd. v. Melvin, [19333 1 D. L. R. (Ont.) 998. See
also The Alwina, (19161 P: 131, in whifkb the Crown asked condemnation of a
neutral ship released' on bail, but defendant instead received "declaration of the
right to restitution" on payment of costs, etc.
'Henderson v. Oroville-Wyandotte Irrig. Dist., 207 Cal. 215, 277 Pac. 487 (1929)
(court drew distinction between validity of order of Railroad CommLnsion, which
lower court could not pass upon, and interpretation of the order); Dankert v. Oro-
ville-Wyandotte Irrig. Dist., 211 Cal. 87, 293 Pac. 785 (1930) (mandamus dlsmms ed,
because above declaratory action pending); Oddenino v. Metropolitan Water Board,
[19141 2 Ch. 734 (right to be supplied, at named rate. Defendant's counterclaim
for declaration that rate for commercial use differed, granted); Barrett v. 1lkeston
Corp., (1917] 1 K. B. 827 (same).
'SManhattan Bridge Three-Cent Line v. City of New York, 204 App. Div. 89,
198 N. Y. Supp. 49, aff'd, 236 N. Y. 559, 142 N. E. 283 (1923) (that provision for
renewal was part of original grant, and not subject to procedure for appraisal for
new term).
"Gillow v. Durham County Council, [1911] 1 K. B. 222 (to cause school to
be cleaned and charge expense to local authority). See also Faber v. Gosworth
U. D. C., 88 L. T. R. 549 (Ch. 1903) (to connect plaintiff's land with defendant's
sewer. Dismissed, because statute provided for arbitration).
"'Attorney-General v. Sharpness New Docks, [1914] 3 K. B. 1 (to maintain and
repair bridges in condition to bear ordinary traffic); Attorney-General v. Scott
[1905] 2 K. B. 160 (counterclaim against injunction for declaration that council
under duty to maintain road in cordition to stand strain of locomotive. Denied,
because it would not here serve useful purpose); City of Mankato v. Board of
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from plaintiff a lower rather than higher contribution to a retire-
ment fund, 5 to submit a scheme for free education and admit
plaintiff's children as free pupils,70 to accept transfer by sale of a
certain school,77 to make or register leases,7 to assume payment of
taxes under a contract,79 to take by eminent domain land which
by zoning provision has been made useless for building,"0 and mis-
cellaneous acts.8'
PUBLIC RIGHTS AND PUBLIC DUTIES
ADMiNISTRATivE boards and officials frequently sue each other
for a declaration of their respective rights and duties. It is evident
that such officials require only adjudication, not coercion, in order
to establish and perform their statutory duties, and that the simplest
procedure for achieving the desired goal is the best. Hence, the
common use of the declaration in such controversies. The right to
make collections or exact taxes or to be reimbursed for funds spent
on behalf of the defendant-body,82 to receive penalties or revenues
Com'rs of Jewell County, 125 Kan. 674, 266 Pac. 96 (1928) (to designate roads);
Prussia, OVG. (Feb. 25, 1909), 31 PREUSS. OBEVERWATUN tS LATr 445 (duty to
maintain road declared, but not how to maintain it, matter for police); Joseph
Crosfield & Sons, Ltd. v Manchester Ship Canal Co., [1904] 2 Ch. 123 (to maintain
certain depth of water in Mersey river and that it had not been maintained) ; Heaver
v. Fulham Borough Council, [1904] 2 K. B. 383 (that certain pipe drain is a
,ewer, and defendants under duty to repair. Denied on merits); Thompson v. Waka-
puaka Drainage Board, [1929J N. Z. 548 (to keep drains dear).
Foster v. Ames, 116 Conn. 505, 165 Atl. 609 (1933) (whether, in view of re-
duced salary, board must accept from teacher percentage of reduced salary instead
of original salary).
"Quinn v. Dundee Education Authority, [1930] S. C. 77 (Scot.).
'Bonnybridge Roman Catholic School Trustees v. Stirlings ire Education Auth-
ority, [1930] S. C. 27 (Scot.), rev'g [1928] S. C. 855.
"In re Tutira Block, 28 N. Z. 505 (1908) (prohibition requested, but declaration
granted); Mann, Crssman & Paulin, Ltd. v. Registrar, [1918] 1 Ch. 202 (refused
to register because of doubt as to validity of term. Held, lease valid).
NTew Haven Water Co. v. New Haven, 106 Conn. 562, 139 AU. 99 (1927)
(whether rates fixed or alterable, and defendant's duty to pay certain federal income
taxes).
'Saxony, OVG. (Nov. 20, 1909), 15 OVG. 30, 3 SomR.EL, JMBTIucH D. VERwL-
TuNGsREcH-rs 769.
'In re Coal Mines Control Agreement (Confirmation) Act, 1918, [1923] 1 Ch.
586 (summons to determine whether an administrative official was under a duty,
created by a 1918 statute, to fix a substitute for profit standard, particularly in
view of a 1920 statute); Wool Sliping & Scouring Co. v. Central Wool Committee,
28 C. L. R. (Aust.) 51 (1920) (plaintiff asked series of orders, which amounted
to restraining sales without appraisal, and declarations of its right to damages as
against certain defendants and to such orders. Plaintiff alleged that defendant
administrative officer, charged with these sales, had not fulfilled his duty); FturnS
v. Public Trustee, [19213 N. Z. 898 (summons for directions to registrar to receive
certain books and accounts as evidence, in settlement of an estate).
'Auckland City v. One Tree Hill Borough, supra note 2 (whether plaintiff or
defendant authority has the right to collect taxes on certain property located on
the boundary between them). The celebrated claim of the Commonwealth of
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
162 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW
collected by defendant,83 to bear or share the expenses of poor
relief or other public services 84-- have all been conveniently settled
by declaration. The conflicting claims of public authorities to spe-
cific property or funds,8 5 or the demand that the defendant-board
Australia to be reimbursed for the interest payments made on behalf of defaulting
New South Wales was adjudicated on a motion by the Attorney-General for a
declaration. Ex parte Attorney-General for Commonwealth, 47 C. L. R. (Aust.)
58 (1932). The state denied the debt and entered a claim for set-off for sums
withheld from state. Declaration granted under the Finance Act of 1932; no juris-
diction of set-off.
'The King v. Melbourne Corp., 27 C. L. R. (Aust.) 387 (1920) (penalties);
Jefferson County v. Gray, Sheriff, 198 Ky. 600, 249 S. W. 771 (1923) (Isguo:
whether the revenues collected must be turned over to county every sixty days or
every two months). In Board of Supervisors of Amherst County v. Combs, State
Comptroller, 169 S. E. '589 (Va. 1933), mandamus to distribute motor fuel tax
among counties, both mandamus and declaration refused; assumpsit recommended.
Cf. The Anichab and other Craft, [1921) P. 218 (suit by Exchequer against Fleet
to determine right to proceeds of German vessels seized in prize in African ports--
whether droits of Crown or of Admiralty).
"Attorney-General v. Hornsey Borough Council, [1927J 1 Ch. 331 (plaintiff asked
a declaration that defendant was liable for the repair of a certain bridge, and under
a duty to keep it in repair); Reigate Corp. v. Surrey County Council, t19281 Ch.
359 (special case, to fix defendant's duty under statute to contribute to cost of
repair of a tunnel on a road, which had become a main road in 1923. Prior to
1923 it was treated as a district-assisted road and defendant made voluntary con-
tributions. When it became a main road, plaintiff claimed power of maintenance,
thus charging defendant with contribution); Old Kilpatrick Parish Council v. il-
marnock Parish Council, [1929) S. C. 651 (Scot.) (plaintiff sought declarator that
on certain dates RH had a parochial settlement in defendant parish and that his
wife and children were then destitute and entitled to relief from defendant, and
repayment of sums expended by plaintiff. RH had deserted his family after moving
them from defendant to plaintiff parish. He later returned to defendant and received
sick relief); Re Township of Pickering & County of Ontario, [19301 1 D. L. R.
(Ont.) 820 (town appealed from an order refusing to declare a bridge a county
bridge. Under statute, bridges of certain dimensions were to be treated as county
bridges. Issue: meaning of length of bridge); Town of Lunenberg v. Municipality
of Lunenberg, [1932] 1 D. L. R. (N. S.) 386 (plaintiff sought declaration that
defendant was joint tenant or tenant in common of certain building and mandatmuts
to' force contribution to repairs. Plaintiff had erected a courthouse and under
statute assigned defendant rooms, for which defendant bad paid. Courthouse had
been destroyed by fire, and dispute arose as to duty to repair) ; Township of Kenyon
v. Township of Charlottenburgh, 53 Ont. R. Rep. 22 (1917) (plaintiff sought declara-
tion that certain roads were boundaries between plaintiff and defendant and that
both plaintiff and defendant were liable for their maintenance); South Canterbury
Hosp. & Charitable Aid Board v. Hawke's Bay Hosp. & Charitable Aid Board, 31
N. Z. 958 (1912) (plaintiff sought declaration fixing district liable to support of
two children); Mayor of Auckland v. Mayor of Mount Eden, 33 N. Z. 97 (1914)
(plaintiff sought to fix defendant's liability to contribute on a population basis to
the equipment and maintenance of a morgue to be erected in Aucland); Palmer-
ston North Kairanga River Board v. Mayor of Palmerston North, 33 N. Z. 513
(1914) (plaintiff sought to determine its powers with respect to levying rates,
particularly with respect of unimproved lands. Defendant had right to take
minerals in such lands); Mayor of Stratford v. The King, [1926) N. Z. 316 (plain-
tiff sought declaration fixing its right to levy certain tax on property leased to
Telegraph Dept., which had originally been held under Crown lease by private
persons, in view of certain statutes); BAYRIUSCUES OBE1PLANDESOERmiCtT (Nov. 21-
Dec. 4, 1911), DAS REcHI (1912) no. 623 (plaintiff community sought declaration
fixing defendant community's duty to assist, by means of certain services without
charge, in the erection of buildings).
'Port of London Authority.v. Canvey Island Com'rs, [1932] 1 Ch. 446 (title to
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or--official undertake specific acts, such as disconnect sewers, ap-
prove plans, make valuations,80 or take particular steps to hold
elections"' can in no other way be determined more efficiently.
Public officials charged with a duty or challenged may initiate
the action for the declaration of their duty. As already observed,
it is a matter of judicial indifference as a rule whether a person al-
legedly charged with duty is sued by the claimant for performance
or for a declaration of right to performance or whether the party
charged sues his opponent for a declaration that he is not under a
dfity, as claimed., Even doubt justifies resort to an action, provided
there are divergent claims. Thus, public officials have sought by
declaration to determine their duty to draw vouchers for money
paid them by mistake,s8 to file reports and in what detail, s  to
resubmit for voting a plan of municipal consolidation, 0 to admit a
claim for compensation for expropriated land., So, public bodies
or officials have sought declarations of their freedom from a claimed
duty to pay money or assume obligations, even where this required
them to assert the invalidity of their own ordinance or contracty2
strip of land); London Corp. v. London County Council, [1931] 1 X. B. 2S (that
certain proceeds of sale of property were "parish property" and vested in plaintiff) ;
Secretary of State of Canada v. Alien Property Custodian, [1930) 3 D. L. R. 81, af"d,
[1931] 1 D. L. R. 890 (conflicting claim of title to enemy-owned stock in Canadian
corporation, certificates having been seized in United States, alleged seizure on books
of company in Canada); Auckland City v. One Tree Hill Borough, supra note 2
(plaintiff's rather than defendant's right to levy taxes).
8Islington Vestry v. Hornsey U. C., [1900] 1 Ch. 69S (disconnect sewer, injunc-
tion asked, but declaration only issued); London County Council v. Port of London
Authority, [1914J 2 Ch. 362 (defendant's duty to certify plaintiff's plans for storm
water outlet); Wanganui County v. Valuer-General and Wanganui Hosp. Board,
[1933] N. Z. 173 (duty of valuer to report in certain ways capital value of taxable
property in plaintiff county).
'Thomas, Mayor v. Covell, Clerk, 119 Kan. 684, 240 Pac. 574 (1925) (mandamus
for "declaratory judgment" that defendant under duty to print ballot, refused for
alleged illegality of demanded form); School Dist. of Union Township v. Walton,
76 Pittsb. Leg. J. (0. S.) 257 (Pa. 1928) (duty of defendants to place on ballot
question of increasing indebtedness, refused for plaintiff's alleged lack of authority).
'Miller v. Limon Nat. Bank, 88 Colo. 373, 296 Pac. 796 (1931).
'Holland, Jailer v. Fayette County, 240 Ky. 37, 41 S. W. (2d) 651 (1931) (also,
what supplies he was bound to furnish and limit of compensation. This action
followed entry of an order against him by fiscal court).
'In re Metropolitan Plan, 77 Pittsb. Leg. J. 481, 609 (Pa. 1929).
'Chairman of County of Kairanga v. Bannister, 33 N. Z. 1184 (1914) (plaintiff
administrative officers sought to determine the validity of a second clam for com-
pensation for land expropriated, when the first claim had been submitted to the
proper statutory procedure and then adjourned to permit settlement).
'City of Milwaukee v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 201 Wis. 512, 230 N. W. 626
(1930) (plaintiff sought declaration ixing its duty to maintain certain bridges. In
1901, plaintiff and defendant agreed for the lowering of the tracks at certain points,
defendant to erect the necessary bridges and city to maintain them, except for
paint. City questioned the validity of the contract); Mlanchester Corp. v. Auden-
shaw U. D. C., [1928] Ch. 127 (plaintiff, charged with upkeep, sought declaration
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Title to public office. Possibly the most convenient way to es-
tablish the right to an office is by declaration, a method open to the
questioned incumbent himself and not involved in the technicalities
of quo warranto, which as a rule is available only to the attorney-
general or some confficting claimant to the office in question. The
right to appointment or promotion or the method of appointment is
frequently raised by declaration." Changes in statutes or alleged
disqualifications frequently create doubts and uncertainties which
induce either the incumbent 4 or the employing authority or at-
determining the extent of its duty to repair-condition as of time of building ot
condition required by modem traffic); Broadview v. Saskatchewan Co-op. Cream-
eries, supra note 45 (in 1925, plaintiff had agreed to furnish defendant's assignor
with electricity for 10 years. Plaintiff now contends that the agreement was
ultra vires and received a declaration to that effect); St. Catharines v. Hydro-
Elec. Power Com'n, [19303 1 D. L. R. (Imp.) 409, aff'g [19281 3 D. L. R. (Ont.)
200, aff'g [19281 1 D. L. R. (Ont.) 598 (plaintiff sought declaration that it was
kiot indebted to defendant in connection with a given project, return of debent-
ures deposited, and order for destruction. In 1917, plaintiff approved a railway
scheme designed by defendant administrative body and issued the bonds required
by statute. In 1920, the work was discontinued. In 1922, statutes regulated the
return of money deposited. Dismissed on merits); City of Swift Current v. Leslie,
9 Sask. 19 (1916) (plaintiff sought declaration that it was not liable in damages for
failure to fulfill agreement and that the agreement was void, judgment setting aside
award); New South Wales v. Commonwealth (No. 1), 46 C. L. R. (Aust.) 159
(1932) (plaintiff sought declarations of the invalidity of the financial agreement
enforcement statutes of 1932, under the constitutional provision as to contracts
between states and the commonwealth on state debts).
'Monckton v. Commonwealth, 27 C. L. R. (Aust.) 149 (1920) (plaintiff
claimed a declaration that he was entitled to appointment to certain civil service
position on or before certain dates on which other persons had received appointment,
and order for payment or difference in salary. Plaintiff had taken an examination
for a higher position and seen two persons with lower ratings appointed to fill
vacancies); Death v. Railway Com'rs for New South Wales, 27 N. S. W. St. R. 187
(1927) (plaintiff, a civil servant, sought to establish his right to promotion under
a 1912 statute, his contention having been upheld on administrative appeal but 1id
superiors refusing to act thereon. Denied); Gaudin v. Auckland Education Board,
33 N. Z. 132 (1914) (plaintiffs sought a declaration construing the statutory pro-
visions as to presentation of names for appointment).
'Hay v. White, 201 Ind. 425, 169 N. E. 332 (1930) (plaintiff sought declara-
tion fixing the person entitled to hold office as mayor. Defendant asserted that
neither candidate for office was eligible. One candidate had received a certificate
of election; both had taken oath of office); Douglass v. Pittman, 239 Ky. $48, 39
S. W. (2d) 979 (1931) (plaintiffs, members of Board of Education, sought declara-
tory judgment determining status of defendant members, charging that they had
disqualified themselves by their business connections and had caused illegal appoint-
ments to the board); Fitzgibbon v. Attorney-General of the Irish Free State,
11930] Ir. R. 49 (plaintiffs, civil employees, sought declaration that they were
entitled to pension under statutes and treaty between Great Britain and Ireland.
Issue: plaintiffs' status as public servants, because their salaries, as tipstaves and
criers in court, had been paid in part by litigants); Cassidy v. Attorney-General of
the Irish Free State, [1930] Ir. R. 65 (plaintiffs, civil servants, sought declarations
that prior to 1922 they were writing clerks on permanent official staff and as such
entitled to office for life, that they were entitled to compensation for their discharge
in 1926, and that the compensation given them was insufficient. Their positions
had been abolished by statute in 1926).
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torney-general9 5 to place in issue the incumbent's right to hold the
office. Again, the issue is often presented in the form of a request
for a declaration that the officer's discharge was unlawful, and that
he is still entitled to hold the office from which he has been ousted."'
The term of the office, placed in doubt by a new statute threatening
to shorten or change it, has on several occasions been put to the test
by a suit of the incumbent against a challenging claimant, elected to
the office, or against officials authorized to hold a new election for
the office.9" The issue usually involves the construction of a statute.
'CIoverdale Union High School Dist. v. Peters, 88 Cal. App. 731, 264 Pac.
273 (1928) (that defendant is not principal of plaintiff's high school); State cx tel.
Hopkins v. Grove, 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82 (1921) (whether defendant could
hold office of city commissioner, depending on question whether his employer, Rail-
road, held a "franchise" from the city, within meaning of statute); Everett v.
Griffiths, [1924] 1 K. B. 941 (that defendant disqualified from sitting as member
of Board of Guardians).
'Hanson v. Radcliffe U. D. C., [1922] 2 Ch. 490 (plaintiff astant teacher
sought a declaration that notice by defendant of termination of service was invalid.
Plaintiff's contract was with a board of managers, which had refused to give this
notice, coupled with an offer to reappoint at a reduced salary, on the defendant's
request); Lonsdale v. Attorney-General, [1928] Ir. R. 35 (1930) (plaintiffs, derks
of Peace and Crown, claimed declarations that they had held such office, and
were entitled to hold it for life, that upon their discharge in 1926 by the Free
State they were entitled to fair compensation. Issue: "fair compensation" and its
calculation under statutes); Zeigler v. City of Victoria, 30 B. C. 389 (1921) (plain-
tiff claimed a declaration that his dismissal as fire captain was invalid or damages
for wrongful dismissal); Cross v. Commonwealth of Australia, 29 C. L. R. (Aust.)
219 (1921) (plaintiff claimed a declaration that his commission in the army had
not been validly cancelled and order for payment of salary. Plaintiff had been
dismissed for publication of an objectionable article); Le Leu v. Commonwealth,
29 C. L. R. (Aust.) 305 (1921) (pla~ntiff, civil servant, claimed a declaration that
he was entitled to retain his office until it was terminated in accordance with a
state statute and that he had been wrongfully deprived of it, reinstatement, and
damages); Trower v. Commonwealth, 32 C. L. R. (Aust.) 585 (1923), af'd on re-
argument, 34 C. L. R. (Aust.) 587 (1924) (plaintiff claimed a declaration that he was
still an officer of the public service and entitled to hold it until it had been terminated
by law, and that he had been wrongfully deprived of it. Case arose on transfer of
service from state to commonwealth); Lucy v. Commonwealth, 33 C. L. R. (Aust.)
229 (1923) (plaintiff claimed a declaration that he was wrongfully deprived of his
office in the public service and that he was entitled to retain it until it was terminated
by law); Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 36 C. L. R. (Aust.) S85 (192S) (plaintiff
claimed a declaration that the order retiring him was void and that he was entitled
to hold his office, and damages. Case arose as to power to retire, after transfer
from state to commonwealth service).
'Robinson v. Moser, 179 N. E. 270 (Ind. 1931) (plaintiff sought declaratory
judgment fixing his term as prosecuting attorney. He had been elected in 1928
for a 1930-1931 term. In 1929, a statute was passed changing election period. After
1930 elections, defendant claimed the office); Enmeer v. Baze, 202 Ind. 6S8, 181
N. E. 1 (1932) (plaintiff clerk of court sought declaration of his rights and duties
under statute. Issue: beginning of defendant's term of office, in view of 1929 statute.
Defendant had been elected in 1930); Wingate, Surrogate v. Flynn, Sec. off State,
139 Misc. 779, 249 N. Y. Supp. 351 (1931) (plaintiff-surrogate sought declaratory
judgment fixing his term of office as 6 or 14 years. Plaintiff had been elected in
1925. At the same election the surrogate's term was increased to 14 years. Defend-
ant, charged with preparing ballots, did not intend to list plaintiff's office as vacant
in 1931); Nova, County Judge v. Flynn, Sec. of State, 139 Misc. 783, 249 N. Y.
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Somewhat unusual was the dilemma of the Pennsylvania county
sheriff who was forbidden by the state constitution to hold any
federal office, whereas by executive order of the President state
sheriffs were designated as prohibition officers. He obtained a decla-
ration to the effect that while sheriff he could not act as federal
prohibition officer, whereas if he resigned he also could not so act,
for he would then have ceased to be a state officer.08
INDIVIDUAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
THE imposition of governmental requirements as a condition of
the exercise of private rights, such as engaging in business, erecting
buildings, or using public facilities, is an inherent element of modern
government. Such requirements are frequently accompanied by the
sanction of a criminal penalty for violation. But in a constitutional
government, only legal demands need to be obeyed, and the question
arises whether the legality of the particular requirement can be put
to the test only after it has been imposed and observed, or, in event
of refusal to obey, only on the suit for a criminal penalty, or in the
alternative, in advance of enforcement. Speed is here a factor and
it is a sound view that the administration should not be unduly
hampered by the courts in the enforcement of its demands. Hence,
the injunction has been frequently invoked as a method of testing
legality in advance of enforcement; but as we have observed on
another occasion,99 the injunction has had to be either abused be-
yond all its normal functions or else it has been refused, either
because a criminal act was in question or because the conditions of
an equitable proceeding were not present,100 the issue going off
on the propriety of injunctive relief rather than on the validity of
the challenged statute, regulation, or order. In some cases, as in
the protest against allegedly illegal taxes, injunction is prohibited
on principle, the taxpayer having only the option to pay and sue for
Supp. 356 (1931) (same situation as in Wingate v. Flynn, supra, except as to county
judge); Fox, Dist. Atty. v. Ross, 7 D. & C. 263 (Pa. 1926) (plaintiff sought declara-
tion fixing his term as district attorney. He had been appointed on resignation
of the duly elected officer. Defendant had filed mandamus for election of a district
attorney at next election, thus making a difference of about one year in the term).
'Starrett's Petition, 9 D. & C. 430 (Pa. 1926). It is not clear whether any
defendant appeared to oppose the petition. If none did, no decision should have
been rendered, for it was then an advisory opinion only.
'Borchard, The Constitutionality of Declaratory Judgments (1931) 31 Cot.
L. REv. 561, 589; see also Note (1932) 41 YAr.E L. J. 1195, 1200.
'Shredded Wheat Co. v. City of Elgin, 284 Ill. 389, 120 N. E. 248 (1918);
Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95, 104, 52 Sup. Ct. 267, 269 (1932) ; Note, supra note
99, at 1199.
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recovery of the tax or to refuse to pay and have his property dis-
trained or suffer arrest.10 1 These crudities constitute an indictment
of the procedural resourcelessness of a legal system which could
apparently discover no way to enable the individual to secure a
prompt adjudication upon the legality of the administrative require-
ment without entangling him in a procedural quagmire and then
leaving it uncertain whether and when the substantive issue would
be reached. The declaratory judgment has shown the way out.
Attention may be called to the New Zealand Declaratory Judg-
ments Act, 02 which enables any person who has done, or desires
under a claim of privilege to undertake, any act the legality of
which depends upon the construction or validity of any statute,
regulation, or local by-law, or indeed of any written instrument,
to obtain against a qualified opponent a declaratory judgment on
the construction or validity of the order or instrument in question.
This, in effect, has been the construction placed upon declaratory
actions in other jurisdictions by means of which the individual,
threatened by the imposition of governmental demands and re-
quirements, such as license, fee, tax, or police-power restriction,
may put to the test the legality of the restriction, without risking
the penalties of disobedience or the hazards and expense of injunc-
tion.10 3  Thus, business men notified to change their methods of
doing business and threatened with a criminal penalty for violation
have claimed a declaration of their privilege to conduct their busi-
ness free from the requirement and penalty and have obtained a
conclusive construction of the administrative order before changing
'See Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53
Sup. Ct. 345 (1933). Under Tennessee law one cannot enjoin a tax collection; but
one can now have a tax demand declared invalid, which is all the relief needed.
I8 EDW. VII, no. 220 (1908) § 3 reads: "When any person has done or
desires to do any act the validity, legality, or effect of which depends on the con-
struction or validity of any statute, or any regulation made by the Governor in
Council under statutory authority, or any by-law made by a local authority, or
any deed, will or document of title, or any agreement made or evidenced by writing,
or any memorandum or articles of association of any company or body corporate,
or any instrument prescribing the powers of any company or body corporate; or
"Where any person claim to have acquired any right under any such statute,
regulation, by-law, deed, will, document of title, agreement, memorandum, articles,
or instrument, or to be in any manner interested in the construction or validity
thereof,
"Such person may apply to the Supreme Court by originating summons return-
able in the said Court for a declaratory order determining any question as to the
construction or validity of such statute, regulation, by-law, deed, will, document
of title, agreement, memorandum, articles, or instrument, or of any part thereof?'
"See Borchard, Judkial Relief for Peril and Insecurity (1932) 45 Hmv. L.
R.Ev. 793, 839.
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the status quo, while yet averting the risks and precarious outcome
of a bill of injunction."0 4 Thus, they have claimed the privilege of
conducting their business free from the requirement of a license"'
or deposit'06 or other government control' °7
The liberty to erect and demolish structures or works free
from the restrictions of zoning or building permits or ordinances has
been most conveniently asserted by declaration, for here injunc-
tions against refusal of a permit are difficult and mandamus is not
likely to be granted when discretion may remain even after adjudi-
cation of the constitutional or legal invalidity of the governing sta-
tute or administrative regulation. The privilege of erecting a filling
station as planned and the claim that the zoning ordinance, on the
basis of which a license had been refused, was not thereby violated,
was successfully asserted in a leading New Hampshire case."' Yale
'Little v. Smith, 124 Kan. 237, 257 Pac. 959 (1927) (privilege to carry cigar-
ette advertisements); Jewell Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Kemper, 206 Ky. 667,
268 S. W. 324 (1925) (privileged to contract for sale of tobacco, without complying
with co-operative law); Path6 Exch. v. Cobb, 202 App. Div. 450, 195 N. Y. Supp.
661 (1922), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 539, 143 N. E. 274 (1923) (plaintiff privileged to exhibit
"1news reels" without submission to censorship); Multnomah County Fair Ass'n. v.
Langley, Dist. Atty., 140 Ore. 172, 13 P. (2d) 354 (1932) (plaintiff's scheme
for horse-racing not violative of lottery and nuisance statutes); cf. Harcourt v.
Attorney-General, (1923] N. Z. 686 (same); Borchard, supra note 103, at 849;
Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S. W. 565 (1927) (pool-room
regulations) ; Utah State Fair Ass'n. v. Green, 68 Utah 251, 249 Pac. 1016 (1926) (priv-
ileged to conduct horse racing without danger of prosecution); Roughley v. Now
South Wales, 42 C. L. R. (Aust.) 162 (1928) (privileged to sell farm produce,
free from administrative inspection of records and regulations of commissions).
"°Hayden Plan Co. v. Wood, 97 Cal. App. 1, 275 Pac. 248 (1929) (permit for
securities business refused, Commissioner asserting plaintiff's amenability to banking
laws); Hayden Plan Co. v. Friedlander, 97 Cal. App. 12, 275 Pac. 253 (1929)
(same); American Trust Co. v. McCallister, 136 Ore. 338, 299 Pac. 319 (1931) (to
sell stock without permit); In re Templar Motor Car Co., 27 Dauph. Co. Rep. 276
(Pa. 1924) (permit to exchange stock demanded by Securities Bureau. Declaration
of lack of jurisdiction requested); Tennessee Eastern Elec. Co. v. Hannah, 157 Tenn.
582, 12 S. W. (2d) 372 (1928) (free from certain certificate of convenience, because
of conditions attached); Scottish Motor Traction Co. v. Lanarkshire County Council,
11929] S. C. 110 (Scot.), rev'g [1928] S. C. 909; James v. Commonwealth, 41 C. L,
R. (Aust.) 442 (1928) (immunity from export license on dried fruits); Roughley
v. New South Wales, supra note 104 (license to sell farm produce); Hamburg,
OVG. I, no. 49, cited in LASSAR, REiCHSVERWALTUNGSGrmC:T (1930) 34 (dentist
free to use gold and platinum without permit).
'Western Australian Ins. Co. v. Attorney-General, [1926] Ir. R. 57 (immune
from demand of fresh deposit for doing business); Dalgety & Co. v. Solicitor-Gen-
eral, 31 N. Z. 632 (1912) (same).
"°Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v. Freedy, 201 Wis. 51, 227 N. W. 992 (1930)
(privileged to organize and invest in non-dividend paying casualty company, which
commissioner disputes under charter); Scales v. Registrar of Companies, [19201 N.
Z. 821 (free to carry on all branches of insurance business); Waitaki Dairy Co. v.
New Zealand Dairy-Produce Control Board, [1927] N. Z. 543 (free from defendant's
control of plant and export); J. A. Redpath & Sons, Ltd. v. New Zealand Fruit-Export
Control Board, [1929] N. Z. 369 (failing proper newspaper publication, plaintiff
asserts freedom from defendant's control).
"Faulkner v. City of Keene, 85 N. H. 147, 155 Atl. 195 (1931). See also
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University asserted its privilege of erecting across a street and with-
out a permit a bridge connecting two of its buildings, but, admitting
its doubt, wisely sought a declaration of its privilege or, in the alter-
native, a declaration as to whose authority was necessary to the
purpose."0 9 In a recent North Carolina case,110 in which a most
competent opinion was rendered, a street railway company was
authorized by a public utility commission to tear up part of its
tracks and substitute motor bus service. It thereupon made a con-
tract with the city for such substitution. Taxpayers and city offi-
cials then threatened the company that if it removed the tracks it
would subject itself to a suit for damages, that its franchise would
be forfeited, and that the contract was illegal. Faced by this attack,
fearing to incur the dangers threatened, and preferring an adjudica-
tion before rather than after the taking of irretrievable steps, the
company brought a successful action against the challengers for a
declaratory judgment that the contract was legal and that it was
privileged to tear up the tracks without danger of incurring the
penalties and losses threatened.
Individuals desirous of exercising privileges in public places
or in particular circumstances against adverse claims of administra-
tive authorities, have asserted their privilege to use the highways
for markets,"' as reporters to enter public buildings and secure
information,1' to go to certain schools, 13 as licensee, to catch both
fish and small game and not merely fish," 4 to use certain profes-
Rosenberg v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 199 Wis. 214, 225 N. W. 838 (1929) (plain-
tiffs property was unaffected by certain zoning ordinance, which could not be
applied retroactively). In Weigand v. City of Wichita, 118 Kan. 26S, 234 Pac.
978 (1925), the plaintiff was held to have insufficient interest, because he alleged
that the ordinance might interfere with uses that he might desire to make of his
property. The suit was premature.
'Yale University v. City of New Haven, supra note 3. See also S. S. Kresge
Co. v. Railroad Com'n, 204 Wis. 479, 235 N. W. 4 (1931) (in which plaintiffs, havingbeen refused permission to erect a new building for an old one in a stream claimed
non-navigable, sought declaration); Grand Junction Waterworks Co. v. Hampton
U. D. C., [1898] 2 Ch. 331 (privilege to erect engine-house, without defendant's.
consent. Refused, special tribunal had jurisdiction); Jackson v. Knutsford U. D.
C., [1914] 2 Ch. 686 (after offering to rebuild condemned structure on compnam-
tion, plaintiffs claim privilege to use existing building, without interference).
'Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Iseley, 203 N. C. 811, 167 S. E. 56 (1933);
cf. Morton v. Pacific Constr. Co., 36 Ariz. 97, 283 Pac. 281 (1929); cases discussed
in Borchard, supra note 103, at 808 et seq.tmGingell, Son & Foskett, Ltd. v. Stepney Borough Council, [1903] 1 K. B. 115.
"Journal Printing Co. v. McVeity, 33 Ont. L. Rep. 166 (1915).
'Gateshead Union v. Durham County Council, [1918J 1 Ch. 146.
"'Barlow v. Jones, Warden, 37 Ariz. 396, 294 Pac. 1106 (1930).
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sional titles, 15 to make limited contributions only to a pension
fund,116 to make a certain composition with creditors.11
The immunity of the citizen from a particular requirement has
been tested quite directly in an attack upon such requirement by
request for a declaration of immunity or of no-duty to comply.
Possibly the best-known English case on this aspect of the problem
is that of Dyson v. Attorney-General,118 which laid down, or at least
strengthened, the foundation for an illustrious line of English cases
expanding the utility of the declaratory judgment, particularly in
its negative form of expression, beyond previous limits. Dyson
asked that certain forms issued by the tax authorities and requiring
under penalty the return of detailed information as to his property
be declared illegal. The Attorney-General, as protector of the
King's rights, claimed that such an issue could be raised only by
petition of right; but the Court of Appeals sustained the propriety of
the declaration, because it put to the test the validity of adminis-
trative acts without purporting to take money out of the Treasury
or require the conveyance of property. That distinction has had
significant results in enlarging the subject's relief against improper
governmental impositions. Lord Justice Farwell in the Dyson case
remarked:
"It would be a blot on our system of law and procedure if there
is no way by which a decision on the true limit of the power of in-
quisition vested in the Commissioners can be obtained by any mem-
ber of the public aggrieved, without putting himself in the invidious
position of being sued for a penalty."" 9
'That college teachers of Hamburg cannot be forbidden to call themselves "pro-
fessor." HA&SEAT. REcHTszTa. 1923, col. 30; ibid. at 388, no. 106; ibid. at 196, no. 47.
"'Foster v. Ames, 116 Conn. 505, 165 At. 609 (1933) (plaintiff teacher asked
declaration fixing the amount which plaintiff was entitled to have accepted by de-
fendant board as payments into the retirement fund. Administrative units had dif-
fered on whether plaintiff should pay on the basis of the contract figure or the
amount actually received); Austria, Sup. Ct. (April 3, 1873), GLU. 4928 (employce-s
against pension institute, that they are not obliged to make contributions until they
have completed forty years' service and that amendments so providing are invalid).
"
7 In re Prince Bliicher, [1931] 2 Ch. 70 (that certain proposal for compo,'tIon,
opposed by Registrar's order, satisfied statutory requirements).8 [19111 1 K. B. 410, aff'd, [1912] 1 Ch. 158; followed by Burghes v. Attorney-
General, [1911] 2 Ch. 139, 156, aff'd, [19121 1 Ch. 173, in which Warrington, J., thor-
oughly approved the declaration and inferentially overruled the adverse views ex-
pressed in Offin v. Rochford R. D. C., (1906) 1 Ch. 342.
1[1911] 1 K. B. 410, 421. And see Fletcher-Moulton, L. J., in the substantive
action, [1912) 1 Ch. 158, 168: "It would be intolerable that millions of the public
should have to choose between giving information to the Commissioners which they
have no right to demand and incurring a severe penalty. There must be some way
in which the validity of the threats of the Commissioners can be tested by those who
are subjected to them before they render themselves liable to penalty, and I can con,
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In a somewhat similar case in Australia,1 0 where a Royal Com-
mission had under penalty required a sugar concern to answer
questions deemed improper and to produce documents considered
privileged, the High Court affirmed its power to grant a declaration
and an injunction against the government where the statute is in-
valid and where unconferrable powers under an otherwise valid sta-
tute or where unconferred powers are attempted to be exercised.
There are numerous instances in which specific demands are thus
challenged by a declaration of the plaintiff's privilege and immun-
ity.121
ceive of no more convenient mode of doing so than by such an action as ths" See
quotation of Fletcher-Moulton by Bankes, L. J., in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York
v. Hannay & Co., [1914] 2 K. B. 536, 569; see also Warrington, L. J., in Burghes v.
Attorney-General, [1911] 2 Ch. 139, 156.
Other cases following the rule in the Dyson case are: Attorney-General v. Foran,
[1916] 2 A. C. 128, aff'g [1915] 1 Ch. 703 (under no duty to make returns on minerals
and privileged to make separate return); Smeeton v. Attorney-General, [1920] 1 Ch.
85 (return for excess profits. Denied); Grant v. Knaresborough U. D. C., [1928]
Ch. 310 (forms vltra vires and void. Attorney-General not a party. Defendants 'with-
drew defense, but notwithstanding, plaintiff introduced evidence and received declara-
tion of invalidity). If administrative officials can be sued to establish their error
without impleading the Attorney-General, the declaration can usually be granted and
the question of petition of right does not arise. China Mut. Steam Navigation Co.
v. MacLay, [1918] 1 K. B. 33 (invalidity of purported requisition). The difficulty
arises as to when the Attorney-General must be made a party, and if so, whether
a petition of right becomes the proper proceeding. That it does not become necessary
where a money claim or breach of contract is not involved, the Dyson case has estab-
lished; see also China Navigation Co. v. Attorney-General, [1932] 2 K. B. 197 (re-
quiring plaintiff to pay for protection against pirates). But a contract claim for a
declaration cannot be successfully brought against an official (Bombay & PersJa Steam
Nay. Co. v. MacLay, [1920] 3 KL B. 402), even were the Attorney-General added.
That can be done only by petition of right. Cf. Jennings, Declaratory Judgments
Against Public Authorities in England (1932) 41 YA= L. J. 407, 423.
The principle of the Dyson case has been applied in other jurisdictions: Hogan v.
Special Com'rs of Income Tax, [1932] Ir. R. 53 (returns for supertax); John Cham-
bers & Sons, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxes, [1916] N. Z. 617 (returns limited to cer-
tain years); Australian Alliance Ass'ce Co. v. Attorney-General of Queensland and
John Goodwyn [1916] Queensl. St. R. 135 (regulations of workmen's compensation
business). By Chubb, J., at 176: "The plaintiffs are not claiming to recover money or
property from the Crown, but simply declarations of their rights (if any) under the
statute. They seek from the court a declaration of the true construction of an Act,
and regulations made thereunder, which, if the contention for the defendants is cor-
rect, they allege, will prevent them from carrying on accident insurance under the
Act, and at the same time impose on them the liability of furnishing, without pay-
ment, burdensome and expensive returns of their business, for non-compliance with
which they are liable to be subjected to severe penalties"). Cf. Egan v. Attorney-
General, [1931] A. C. 113 (former officers of the Irish constabulary and dependents
receiving pension claimed that, under rules and statutes, allowances for rent, etc.,
should be included in fixing the basis on which compensation was to be paid under
the statutes disbanding the constabulary); N'xon v. Attorney-General, [1930] 1 Ch.
566 (plaintiff retired civil servants claimed declaration that they were entitled to
superannuation allowance under 1859 and 1909 statutes and that a 1922 Treasury
Minute was null and void in so far as it purported to limit their rights to this allow-
ance. Denied, because not claiming a right).
'Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Attorney-General, 15 C. L. R. (Aust.) 182
(1912).
'Dowdy v. City of Covington, 237 Ky. 274, 35 S. W. (2d) 304 (1931) (plain-
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GOVERNMENT'S CLAIMS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS
IN its dealings with individuals, the administration may prefer
a declaration of rights to other form of remedy. This may be due
to a feeling of doubt whether its claim is quite sound or of assurance
that a declaration is equally satisfactory in obtaining the desired
relief. It may also be due to a fear that if it acts before a judicial
guaranty of the correctness and legality of its proposed step it would
expose itself to damages or other sanction, and the executing officer,
to criminal penalty or dismissal. We have already observed that
under this motivation the administration has sued the private in-
dividual affected for a declaration of its privilege to sell land for
delinquent taxes, to take land for a purpose alleged to be public, to
demolish or remove buildings, to enter upon land, to seize or detain
property, to levy execution, to arrest a delinquent,12 or, in relation
to public officials, to dismiss, transfer, or retire them.2
In this field of relations the administration frequently sues to
establish its right to money, for taxes or reimbursement of expendi-
tures or on other account, or its right to property or a lien thereon.
With the enforcing machinery at its own disposal, a declaration of
the government's right seems adequate protection to safeguard the
public interest. It may also sue for a declaration of the defendant's
duty, or of his no-right to violate the law or make other improper
claim, in many cases an adequate sanction for law observance, in-
tiff, moving van proprietor, sought declaration that an ordinance requiring registration
of full name and address of persons moving was unconstitutional, on the ground that
it had received an administrative construction in favor of non-resident movers. Plain-
tiff secured a declaration that it did not warrant such interpretation); Flint v.
Attorney-General, [19182 1 Ch. 216, aff'd, [1918] 2 Ch. 50 (plaintiff asked declaration
that he was not obliged to comply with a military notice and that it was illegal as to
him. He claimed exemption as a clergyman); Western Australian Ins. Co. v. Attorney-
General, [1926) Ir. R. 57 (plaintiff claimed a declaration that it was not liable under
a demand from the Irish Free State for a deposit, required to do business under a
certain statute. Plaintiff had paid this deposit in England previously); Lawson v.
Interior Tree, Fruit & Vegetable Committee, [19301 4 D. L. R. (B. C.) 1027, rcv'd,
[1931] 2 D. L. R. (Can. S. C.) 193 (plaintiff fruit dealer sought declaration that he
was under no duty to secure a license from defendant, to pay its levies, or obey its
rules. Case turned on the validity of certain sections of statute) ; Hamilton v. Cum-
ruing, [19191 N. Z. 131 (plaintiff architect sought declaration fixing the validity of a
regulation of the New Zealand Institute of Architects, made under statutory authority,
requiring signature to a certain declaration. Plaintiff had refused to sign it without
amendment) ; 2 -AMBURGiScHES OBERVERwALTUNGSGER1CIrT no. 15, LAssMA, Rricns-
VERWALTUNGSGERcHT 34 (plaintiff owner of private school sought declaration that she
cannot be forced to cut future classes); WRTTEMBERGISCER VRwALra uNOsoFRncITs-
HOP , SOERGEL, RECHTSPRECHUNG (1916) 500 (declaratory action fixing the amount of
water fee); TRAum, op. cit. supra note 5, at 52, 54 (individual's denial of a duty
arising out of police demands with respect to clearing streets, roads, ditches, etc.).I ' 'Supra notes 47 and 54.
'Supra note 56.
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stead of injunction, criminal prosecution, distraint, or abatement.
This liability to governmental exaction, whether by way of tax, li-
cense, or other restriction, contested by the affected individual, may
conveniently be placed in issue and decided before the physical
imposition of the charge, with its attendant risks of error.
In the assertion of right to money, the administration has ad-
vanced claims for service charges of various kinds, 12 for forfeiture
by way of confiscation,'2 for recovery of moneys misapplied or
wrongfully obtained,126 or for taxes due and payable.
-12 7
T hBarraclough v. Brown, [1897] A. C. 615 (plaintiff administrative officer sued
for a declaration of his right to recover sums expended in attempting to remove ship
L, belonging to defendants, from a river channel, where she mas an obstruction to
commerce); Chorley Corp. v. Nightingale, [19061 2 K. B. 612 (plaintiffs, administrative
officers, sought a declaration that they were entitled to reimbursement, under statute,
for repairs made on a highway after defendant property owner had refused to do
so. Defendant contended that he was not responsible for that part of the highway) ;
Sunderland Corp. v. Gray, [19281 Ch. 756 (plaintiff sought a declaration that de-
fendant was bound to pay the sum assessed for paving in front of his property,
work which had been done under statute) ; The Countess, supra note 53 (plaintiff
boat owners sought to limit their liability for collision by their ship with dock gates,
and sued in detinue for retention of ship, which defendant had raised. Defendant
counterclaimed for a declaration of its right to detain until certain sums were paid);
Sydney Harbour Trust Com'rs v. Harriott, 32 C. L. R. (Aust.) 53 (1923) (case
stated to determine whether defendant was liable to plaintiff for dock fees under
statute permitting plaintiff to charge such fees); Ford Shipping Line, Ltd. v. Super-
intendent of Mercantile Marine, 29 N. Z. 679 (1910) (plaintiff sued to recover money
alleged to have been wrongfully required under statute as deposit for expenses of
seaman who left ship on account of injuries received in the course of duty. In de-
ciding the case, the court stated that the point might well have been decided by
declaratory judgment procedure); Auckland City Corp v. Dawson, [19291 N. Z. 614
(case stated by President of Compensation Court to determine whether plaintiff was
entitled to compensation for betterment of land); Nelson City Corp. v. Busbridge,
[19301 N. Z. 269 (plaintiff sought declaration determining right of municipal cor-
poration under statute to surcharge for delay in paying gas and electricity, bills. It
gave discount for prompt payment).
'Administrator of German Property v. Knoop, [1933] Ch. 439 (claim to ex-
enemy property confiscated under art. 297 Ee] of Treaty of Versailles).
'-Burnham-on-Sea U. D. C. v. Channing, [1933J Ch. 583 (suit for subsidy money
obtained by housebuilder who had violated terms of grant); Rex v. Clement, 6 W.
W. R. 414 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1914) (money paid as travelling allowance to judge, who
had stated wrong domicil. Fraud claimed, but Exchequer Court held without juris-
diction of that charge).
-Attorney-General v. Dodd, [1892] 2 Q. B. 150 (information for a declaration
that certain hereditaments passing under a voluntary settlement were subject to ac-
count duty under statute, as personal property, though unsold); Attorney-General v.
Duke of Richmond, Gordon & Lennox (No. 1), [1907] 2 K. B. 923, aff'd [190s] 2 K.
B. 729 (information for a declaration that certain deductions were not allowed in the
assessment of defendant's estate for purposes of estate duty) ; Attorney-General v. Peek,
[1912] 2 K. B. 192, aff'd, E1913] 2 K. B. 487 (Crown claimed declarations that duties
became payable upon termination of life estate in advowsons. No tax was paid on
the termination of the first life estate by death, or upon the sale by second life tenant) ;
Attorney-General v. Farrell, [1930] 1 K. B. 539, aff'd, [1931] 1 K. B. 81 (plaintiff
asked declaration that on death of first remainderman to have possession the estate
duty was payable on the principal value of property passing on his death under a
certain statute. The original gift had been so varied that when the first remainder-
man went into possession, he received the smaller portion of the income, and the
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The claim to property or rights in property has taken the
form of an assertion that disputed property was public and not
private,12 that the administration be declared to have a lien or
prior lien on defendant's property for improvements or services ren-
dered or other assessable charges, 2 9 or that the government has a
prior right to the use of property.'8"
A controversy between administration and citizen as to the
second, the larger); Attorney-General v. Adamson, [1932] 2 K. B. 159 (Crown sought
declarations and orders fixing estate and succession duties due on the death of the
settlor, who had died without exercising his power of appointment. Provision had
been made that JW was to take two-fifths, remainder equally to settlor's other children.
JW survivor settlor) ; Gowers v. Walker, [1930] 1 Ch. 262 (plaintiffs, tax officals, by
way of special case, claimed a declaration that a certain sum, in respect of tax de-
ducted for 1924 from interest paid by the bankrupt company, was a claim to be pre-
ferred by the receiver under statute) ; Attorney-General for Ontario v. National Trust
Co., [1931] 1 D. L. R. (Ont.) 354 aff'd, [1931] 2 D. L. R. (Ont.) 712 (plaintiff
sought declaration that the value of the shares for succession duty should be taken
as of time of testator's death, not as of date of gift. Prior to his death, testator had
given his wife stock, not available on the market, which had quadrupled in value
between date of gift and his death); Provincial Secretary-Treasurer v. Robinson, 47
N. B. 55 (1919) (plaintiff sought declaration that succession duty was payable on
funds passing to defendants as trustees and at a named rate); 72 RG. 155 (Nov. 5,
1909) (plaintiff sued for repayment of tax; fiscms counterclaimed for declaration that
further tax was due on the agreement in question).
'City of Paducah v. Mallory, 225 Ky. 692, 9 S. W. (2d) 1015 (1928) (whether
dedication effective. City wishes to improve street, alleged to have been dedicated,
but defendants in possession deny validity of dedication. Held, valid); Attorney-
General for New South Wales v. Hill & Hall, 32 C. L. R. (Aust.) 112 (1923) (Crown's
claim to crops resting on earlier lien against claim of defendant resting on earlier regis-
tration); Mayor of Wellington v. Stafford, [1927] N. Z. 552 (that certain land was a
public road); Attorney-General ex rel. Mayor of Dunedin v. Dunedin Arcade Co.,
[1929] N. Z. 621 (certain passage was a public way and had been dedicated).
','West Ham Corp. v. Sharp, [1907] 1 K. B. 445 (plaintiff sought a declaration
that under statute he was entitled to a charge on defendant's property for balance
of apportioned cost of building a private road and that such charge was prior to
all others, order for sale, and appointment of receiver) ; Croyden R. D. C. v. Betts,
[1914] 1 Ch. 870 (plaintiffs sought declaration that under sanitary statute they were
entitled to charge certain sums on defendant's property for improvements executed
by them, sale, and receiver); Kingston-upon-Hull Corp. v. North Eastern Ry. Co.,
[1915] 1 Ch. 456 (plaintiff sought declaration that a certain expense incurred by It
as urban sanitary authority in executing named works, with interest, was a charge
on defendant's property until payment-under a named statute); Bristol Corp. v.
Sinnott, [1917] 2 Ch. 340, aff'd, (19181 1 Ch. 62 (plaintiffs sought declaration that un-
der statutory authority they were entitled to a charge on defendant's property for
amount apportioned to him); Macclesfield Corp. v. Macclesfield Grammar School,
[19211 2 Ch. 189 (plaintiff claimed a declaration that certain debts were a charge on
defendant's property. Acting under statute, plaintiff had improved street on which de-
fendant's property abutted, because defendant refused to do so. Defendant refused
to pay); Sunderland Corp. v. Priestman, [19271 2 Ch. 107 (plaintiff asked an order
declaring certain sums, interest, and costs a charge on defendant's property. Plain-
tiff had been forced to repair road when defendant's predecessor in title had failed
to perform his covenant to repair a certain portion of road); Paddington Borough
Council v. Finucane, E19281 Ch. 567 (plaintiffs asked declaration that a certain sum
be made a charge against defendant's house and that it be made prior to all other
charges. Defendant tenant had not acted on plaintiffs' notice; freeholder and other
lessees contended that the judgment ran only against defendant tenant).
'City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co., 209 Cal. 105, 287 Pac. 47 (1930).
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latter's duty may, if the government considers that it is adequately
protected, be determined by way of a declaration of the defendant's
duty, which may, if desired, be combined with a request for coercive
relief. Thus, the government has sued for a declaration that the
defendant is under duty to maintain, repair, or widen a highway,1 '
to supply water, 32 to remove an inmate from a poor house,133 to
assume a surety's responsibility on bond for state funds in a defunct
bank,1 34 to pay road and transit fees, 3 ' to take out a license.'"
Observance of the law is often conveniently secured by a decla-
ration that the defendant has no right to do some specific act or
maintain a claim alleged to be illegal. The demand may or may
not be accompanied by request for an injunction, which often is
denied whereas the declaration may be granted. Thus, the admin-
istration has sought declarations that the citizen has no right to
erect or maintain certain structures, except as permitted by the
government, 37 to effect a sewer connection with plaintiff's sewers,"
to open a burial vault except for interment,13 to impose certain
conditions in a deed to the community, 40 to hold meetings on a
beach,' to display films on unlicensed premises, 1 ' to have a ship
2'Hertfordshire County Council v. Great Eastern Ry. Co., [1909] 1 K. B. 368,
aff'd, [1909J 2 K. B. 403 (to maintain certain section of highway); Attorney-General
v. Roe, [1915] 1 Ch. 235 (to repair footpath, rebuild wall, and abate nuisance. Denied
as separate declarations, because included in mandatory injunction); Rhondda U. D.
C. v. Taff Vale Ry. Co., [19081 1 K. B. 239 (to widen railway crossings).
'City of Bayonne v. East Jersey Water Co., 103 AUt. 121 (N. J. Eq. 1919) (de-
fendant refused to deliver, on ground that assignment of contract to plaintiff city
invalid. Assignment upheld. The water company might have taken the initiative and
have sued on their claim that they were relieved of further performance, because the
assignment was invalid); cf. Socit6 Maritime et Commerciale v. Venus Steam Ship-
ping Co., 9 Com. Cas. 289 (1904).
"New Monkland Parish Council v. Erskine, [1926] S. C. Scot. 83S.
"Lawrence v. American Surety Co., 249 N. W. 3 (Iich. 1933) (declaratory
action to fix duty of several sureties inter se and to the state, in view of debatable
release of one).
'=Bavaria, VERw. GmicmsIS GESETZ, art. 8, no. 19, cited in TAUM, op. Cit. supra
note 5, at 59.
"'Mayor of Timaru v. South Canterbury Elec.-Pow r Board, [1928] N. Z. 174
(license of motor vehicles; issue: "used for commercial purposes"). See also VEaw.
GER. BREmEN (Nov. 11, 1925), HANSEAT. REcHTszTC. (1925) 955, cited in LAss.mn,
R.CHSvERWALTUGSGERICmT (1930) 34 (salesman's certificate).
' Attorney-General v. Prices' Tailors (1928), Ltd., [1930] 2 Ch. 316; Ruislp-
Northwood U. D. C. v. Lee, 145 L. T. R. 208 (K. B. 1931).
'East Barnet Valley U. C. v. Stallard, 79 L. J. Ch. 103 (1909).
'Hoskyns-AbrahaU v. Paignton U. C., [1929] 1 Ch. 375 (defendant's counterclaim
for declaration granted).
"'Village of Grosse Pointe Shores v. Ayre, 254 Mich. 58, 235 N. W. 829 (1931).
"Llandudno U. D. C. v. Woods, [18991 2 Ch. 705 (injunction denied).
"
2Attorney-General v. Vitagraph Co., [1915] 1 Ch. 206; cf. The King v. Ottanva
Elec. R. Co., [1933J 1 D. L. R. (Ont.) 695 (to run cars on a certain loop. Denied
within discretion as unnecessary, for authorizing Order in Council may be revoked at
any time).
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registered as British,'43 to permit students to practice dentistry and
charge fees,'44 to claim a higher salary. 4' These are but illustra-
tions of the types of issues which the administration can put to the
test in conflicts with individuals designed to insure observance of
the law.
It frequently happens that the administration is not prepared
to enforce a demand for taxation or other charge, but desires, never-
theless, as a guide to future action, to have a dispute with an affected
citizen adjudicated. This is a convenient way to clear the title, so
to speak, of both or all parties to the issue, and is much more effi-
cient than to risk the consequences of mistaken action. Thus, the
liability of certain land or persons to taxation may, on dispute, be
raised by declaratory action of the administration as plaintiff,"'
a method especially appropriate on a claim to specific exemption or
reduction of tax. 47
"The St. Tudno, [1918] P. 174 (owned by British corporation with German
stockholders).1
"Powers v. Vinsant, 165 Tenn. 390, 54 S. W. (2d) 938 (1932).
1 4RG. March 9, 1926, HOEtHST. RECHTSPRCH0. (1926) no. 1S57 (government's
counterclaim).
1 Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Co. v. City of Morehead, 223 Ky. 698, 4 S. W.
(2d) 726 (1928) (plaintiff city sought declaration of rights as to paving assem-ment,
in which defendant railway claimed exemption. Contractor was unwilling to pro-
ceed until issue was settled. Issue: construction of dedication deed); Town Board
of Greece v. Murray, 130 Misc. 55, 223 N. Y. Supp. 666 (1927) (plaintiff sought
declaration fixing its own liability and that of defendant contractor, bondsmen, and
certain interested administrative officers on a contract for road construction); State
Board of Examiners v. Standard Engineering Co., 157 Tenn. 157, 7 S. W. (2d) 47
(1928) (plaintiff sought declaration fixing the liability to a license tax of an organ-
ization using a trade name but not doing the type of professional work so indicated,
in view of certain statutes); Islington Corp. v. London School Board, (19021 2
K. B. 701 (plaintiffs sought a declaration fixing defendants' liability for deficiencies
under an assessment, on the ground that defendants had taken over land under
certain statutes); Provincial Treasurer v. Smith, 51 N. S. 490 (1917) (special case
to determine sitm of bank shares to ascertain liability to succession tax); Mayor,
etc., of Napier v. McDougall, 31 N. Z. 1081 (1912) (plaintiff sought to determine
whether it could levy a special rate in a district which had been added to the
borough. Defendant lived in that district and had refused to pay the levy); Wel
lington Harbour Board v. Union Steamship Co., (1916] N. Z. 849 (plaintiff sought
to determine the validity of a by-law imposing a tax on goods discharged in the
port making it payable by the ships-tax to be used for harbor improvement);
Eastbourne Borough Council v. Wellington City Corp., [1929] N. Z. 441 (plaintiff
sought to determine whether certain lands held by defendant were rateable property
under statute. The land was used to raise young trees).
.. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Sydney v. Metropolitan Water, Sewerage &
Drainage Board, 40 C. L. R. (Aust.) 472 (1928) (plaintiff administrative authorities
sought a declaration that defendant was liable under statute for water rates on
property occupied by a certain school); Wellington Harbour Board v. Union Steam-
ship Co. of New Zealand, 32 N. Z. 766 (1913) (plaintiff sought declaration deter-
mining defendant's liability to wharf tax. Issue: whether the exemption attaching
while carrying mails lasted for whole voyage, although mails were carried for only
a portion. Mails were not on board when the ships entered plaintiff's harbor);
Mayor of Miramar v. Devoy, 34 N. Z. 1072 (1915) (plaintiff sought to determine la-
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TAXATION
MANY declaratory challenges have been directed by protesting
taxpayers to the constitutionality, construction, or interpretation
)of statutes purporting to subject them to a certain tax."4" Not in-
frequently, the administration has itself sought a declaration that
the defendant was under a duty to pay a specific tax or was not
exempt or was in general subject to the jurisdictional taxing powers
of the plaintiff-authorities. 14 9
In the present article, attention will be directed to the indi-
vidual's claims against the administration to immunity from assess-
ments (1) by reason of the nature or situs of, or interest in, or
use or contractual exemption of, the property, or on the ground
that he is personally exempt or that the amount of the tax is un-
duly high or the classification improper; or (2) because in the actual
administration or assessment of the tax there has been actual or
threatened illegality or error, e.g., in failing to comply with the sta-
tutory or lawful requirements for a valid assessment, in the matter
of valuations, tax rate, mode of assessment, amount claimed, inci-
dence of the tax, discriminations, deductions allowed, time for ap-
peal, and similar matters. In all these cases, the issue is narrowed
to the precise question on which tax liability or exemption depends.
Immunity from taxation has thus been claimed for specific
property, items, or income by reason of its nature or source1 0 or
bility to tax of property used for school during the week and church on Sunday);
Napier Borough v. Hawke's Bay Ed. Board, [1924] N. Z. 596 (plaintiff sought to de-
termine defendant's liability on a rate imposed to pay loans. ihe land was used for
school purposes and had been subject to this tax when acquired); Napier Borough
Council v. Napier Harbour Board, [1930] N. Z. 239 (plaintiff sought to determine
whether land used for quarrying stone for harbor works was subject to tax); North-
cote Borough Council v. Buchanan, (1930J N. Z. 798 (plaintiff sought to determine
when a statutory provision for reduction of rates on vacant property applied. Plaintiff
contended that it applied only when tax on annual or capital value existed).
"Frazier v. City of Chattanooga, 156 Tenn. 346, 1 S. W. (2d) 786 (1928); Erie
Beach Co. v. Attorney-General for Ontario, [1930] 1 D. L. R. (Imp.) 859, aff'g
[1929] 2 D. L. R. (Ont.) 754; Spooner Oils, Ltd. v. Turner Valley Gas Conservation
Bd., [19323 4 D. L. R. (Alta.) 729, 750; Mason v. City of Victoria, 26 B. C.
418 (1918); John Fairfax & Sons, Ltd. v. New South Wales, 39 C. L. R. (Aust.)
139 (1927); Universal Film Mfg. Co. (Australasia), Ltd. v. New South Wales, 40
C. L. R. (Aust.) 333 (1927).
1 Washington County High School Dist. v. Board of Com'rs of Washington
County, 85 Colo. 72, 273 Pac. 879 (1928); Haggerty, Sec. of State, v. Potter, 252
Mich. 460, 233 N. W. 380 (1930); Johnson City v. Clinchfield R. R. Co., 163 Tenn.
332, 43 S. W. (2d) 386 (1931).
IwState ex rel. Smith v. Board of Com'rs of Shawnee County, 132 Kan. 233,
294 Pac. 915 (1931) (war-risk insurance claimed tax-exempt); Hogan v. Special
Com'rs of Income Tax, [1932] Ir. R. 53 (immune from supertax, assesd after
death on past income); Erie Beach Co. v. Attorney-General for Ontario, supra note
148, rev'g [1928J 1 D. L. R. (Ont.) 739 (succession and transfer tax, on shares
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by reason of the interest of the party assessed. 1 Tax exemptions
have been claimed by reason of the public nature 2 or statutory
privilege"'3 of the owner of property or of its use for religious1' or
charitable.55 purposes, or because exempted on other grounds."'
The immunity of the person assessed, because he or his property is
-without the jurisdiction"' or because he does not come within the
issued and unissued); In re Succession Duties Act, 23 Alta. L. R. 521 (1928) (tax-
ability of provincial bonds); In re Succession Duty Act and Wilson, 36 B. C. 450
(1926) (not subject to succession duty); Bowman v. Attorney-General, 38 B. C.
1 (1926) (devise of real estate, decided preliminary to probate); Fowkeg v. Minister
of Finance, 38 B. C. 395 (1927) (certain stocks and bonds); McLeod v. City of
Windsor, 52 Ont. L. Rep. 562 (1922) (assessment on income of estate); Macrae
Mining Co. v. Township of Bucke, 58 Ont. L. Rep. 453 (1926) (mining rights
not merged in surface rights and not subject to tax or sale); Grigg v. Commlssloner
of Taxes, [1920] N. Z. 508 (net earnings from race meetings); Wright, Stephenson
& Co. v. Commissioner of Taxes, [1921] N. Z. 633 (pension fund).
Iin the Matter of Finance Acts, 1894-1910, [1931] Ir. R. 98 (interest of
testator in property); McPhedran & Cleland v. Toronto, [1932] 1 D. L. R. (Ont.)
439, aff'd [19321 2 D. L. R. (Ont.) 202 (improvements on leased property); Vaughn
v. Attorney-General, 20 Alta. L. R. 424 (1924) (holder in escrow only, not owner);
Public Trustee v. Chairman of County of Waipawa, [1921J N. Z. 1104 (property
held in trust for King).
'City of Louisville v. Cromwell, State Treasurer, 233 Ky. 828, 27 S. IV. (2d)
377 (1930); Public Trustee v. Hutt River Board, 34 N. Z. 753 (1915) (held as
Crown land through mortgage foreclosure); Public Trustee v. Chairman of County
of Waipawa, supra note 151, (held in trust for King); The King v. Mayor of Ingle-
wood, [1931J N. Z. 177 (Crown exempt on land taken over in default of mortgago
debt).
'State ex rel. Smith v. Board of Com'rs of Shawnee County, supra noto 15o
(property belonging to minor children of deceased soldier in bands of guardian
claimed as federal tax-exempt funds).
'Hodge v. City of Moose Jaw, 19 Sask. L. R. 369 (1925) (part used for
public worship exemption on whole claimed); Perpetual Trustees, Estate & Agency
Co of New Zealand v. Mayor of City of Dunedin, 34 N. Z. 877 (1915) (part
leased).
'Re Assessment Navy League of Canada, 59 N. S. 212 (1927) (having taken
over work of tax-exempt Seamen's Society, question, had exemption carried over);
Swinburne v. Federal Com'r of Taxation, 27 C. L. R. (Aust.) 377 (1920) (whether
certain institution was "charitable," so as to entitled plaintiff to deduction from
tax on gift of money to it); President of Shire of Nunawading v. Adult Deaf &
Dumb Soc. of Victoria, 29 C. L. R. (Aust.) 98 (1921) (whether land used for
growing flowers to sell for maintenance and leased for picnics was "charitable" use) ;
Daly v. State of Victoria, 29 C. L. R. (Aust.) 491 (1921) (charitable bequests in
will).
'State ex rel. Peterson, Atty. Gen. v. Maricopa County, 38 Ariz. 347, 300 Pac.
175 (1931) (whether mortgage foreclosure sale merged a prior tax lion); People's
Telephone Corp. v. City of Butler, 99 Pa. Super. 256 (1930) (that lot and build-
ing used in good faith for plaintiff's business, hence tax-exempt) ; Canadian Northern
Pac. Ry. Co. v. City of Kelowna, 25 B. C. 514 (1917) (that land sold for delinquent
taxes was actually tax-exempt. So held); Canadian Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
City of Vernon, 26 B. C. 222 (1918) (same. Contention that ta. appeal should have
been taken, dismissed).
'Box Elder County v. Conley, County Assessor, 75 Utah 199, 284 Pac. 105
(1930) (that automobile assembled in California and shipped to Utah was not
taxable in Utah for that year); Barwick v. South Eastern & Chatham Ry. Cos.,
[1921J 1 K. B. 187, aff'g (1920] 2 K. B. 387 (whether reclaimed land within taxing
district); Hope v. Edinburgh Corp., 5 Scot. L. T. 195 (1897) (land not within
taxing jurisdiction); Re Parker and Succession Duty Act, 36 B. C. 299 (1925)
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statutory definition of those liable to tax,' or that the tax is limited
to the amount offered or admitted,159 or that the classification of
the property for taxation was erroneous"'0 is commonly claimed by
declaration.
Attacks upon the propriety or payability of a tax have raised
questions as to the necessity for a levy;"0 ' the illegality of the gen-
eral tax rate; 6 ' the failure to comply with statutory requirements
conferring the necessary jurisdiction to tax;" the correctness or
(mortgage debts outside province); Murray v. Federal Com'r of Taxation, 29 C.
L. R. (Aust.) 134 (1921) (validity of assessment on dividends paid to resident of
England by English and Australian companies).
"SFrank v. Lindsey, 156 Tenn. 456, 2 S. W. (2d) 412 (1928) (that tax on
auto tire merchants did not apply to plaintiff, because, while he sold tires, be did
not also run a service station); Parmer v. Lindsey, 157 Tenn. 29, 3 S. W. (2d) 657
(1928) (that plaintiff not a "general contractor" or within the enumerated occupa-
tions subject to tax); Vaughn v. Attorney-General, supra note 151 (that plain-
tiff's deceased husband held vendor's deed in escrow only, hence not owner,
and exempt); Grigg v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra note 150 (racing society
claimed immune from income tax); 31 RG. 30 (Feb. 24, 1893) (joint stock corpora-
tion claimed exemption from stamp tax); RG. June 16, 1925, HoEcsr. RXnc scPCU.
(1925) no. 1811 (same).
'Cupp Grocery Co. v. Johnstown, 288 Pa. 43, 135 AUt. 610 (1927) (plaintiff
owner of 33 stores claims liability to only one license tax of $100 as a corporation,
not $915 as assessed); Donnelly v. Commissioner of Stamps, 33 N. Z. 79 (1914)
(5%, not 107, the proper rate); RG. May 12, 1911, SoM.oEi. (1911) 582 (no
higher stamp for deed claimable than one used).
'°Newman Mfg. Co. v. Marrable, [19311 2 K. B. 297 (that beads imported
were not "unfinished buttons" and hence dutiable); Tilling-Stevens Motors, Ltd.
v. Kent County Council, [19291 1 Ch. 66 (that plaintiff's motor car is "electrically
driven" and not assessable); Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for Queens-
land v. Federal Com'r of Taxation, 34 C. L. R. (Aust.) 580 (1924) (whether appel-
lant was a person and liable to, or a corporation, hence exempt from, income tax).
'Denver Land Co. v. Moffat Tunnel Impr. Dist., 87 Colo. 1, 284 Pac. 339
(1930) (past levies invalid, because bond issue which they served, invalid. Dis-
missed for lack of necessary parties); British Fisheries Soc. v. Magistrates of Wick,
10 M. 426 (Scot. 1872) (that accumulation of surplus from past levies made tax
improper).
"=Anderson, Sheriff, v. Gillis, 242 Ky. 404, 46 S. W. (2d) 508 (1932) (plaintiff
taxpayers and property owners sought a declaration that a certain portion of the
tax rate was illegal. The rate had been increased in 1918, in 1922 by a bond issue,
and in 1927 by election authorizing continuance of 1922 levy. Defective parties,
so case remanded); Parrish v. Hackney Corp., [1911] 2 K. B. 822 (plaintiff occupier
of licensed premises asked declaration that a certain rate was illegal, in so far as
it differed from those fixed by the quinquennial valuation list, and injunction);
Raglan Town Board v. Raglan County, [1920] N. Z. 646 (plaintiff sought a declara-
tion that there should not be a general rate for the tax district but that distinctions
should be made between the town and outlying districts).
'Gwynne v. Board of Education of Union Free School Dist., 234 App. Div.
629, 252 N. Y. Supp. 625 (1931) (plaintiff sought declaration and injunction, on
the ground that defendant could not legally tax his property, objection to con-
solidation of school districts); Villeneuve v. Rural Municipality of Kelvington,
[1929] 2 D. L. R. (Sask.) 919 (plaintiff landowners sought declaration as to validity
of awards by an engineer and assessment under a ditch statute, on the ground that
the proceedings were void for want of required notice to, and meeting of, the land-
owners involved and also for exceeding cost limit); Fletcher v. Wainono Drainage
Board, [1917] N. Z. 405 (plaintiff landowner sought to determine the validity of
a tax, on the ground that the proceedings to annex plaintiff's district to defendant's
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validity of the tax base or valuation for assessment; 104 the correct-
ness of the mode ofassessment, discriminating against or improperly
burdening the complainant; 05 the amount of tax due; 1 0 the inci-
dence of the tax;' the amount of deductions allowable;10 8 and
were invalid for want of notice to, and hearing of, landowners involved); Blenheim
Corp. v. Australian Mut. Provident Soc., [1922] N. Z. 1229 (plaintiff sought to
determine the validity of a rate imposed to pay off loan for gas works construction.
Issue: interest, sinking fund, etc., as included in "repayment of moneys borrowcd,"
as the resolution submitted to taxpayers did not specifically mention them In
describing the tax).
"'Edinburgh & Glasgow Ry. Co. v. Meek, 12 D. 153 (Scot. 1849) (plaintiff
sought declarator fixing the assessable value of the railroad and the proportion pay-
able in each parish, under statutes taxing railroads for poor benefit [proportion-
local mileage: total mileage] and permitting parishes a choice of three ways of
assessing); Rex v. Miebach, 22 Alta. L. R. 482 (1927) (special case to determine
construction of "net value" under succession duty statute); Finch v. Commissioner
of Stamps, 33 N. Z. 144 (1914) (case stated to determine the basis of taxation on
property deeded to sons at a price less than its true value); Mayor of Christchurch
v. Christchurch Drainage Board, [19251 N. Z. 837 (plaintiff, unit for levy and
collection of taxes, sought to determine the proper basis of taxation. Boroughs and
cities had used unimproved value. Counties and defendant levying on a speclal
area had used capital value. Plaintiff wished to collect as it did its own taxes);
Ellis & Burnand, Ltd. v. Waitomo County, [1926 N. Z. 669 (plaintiff, a timber-
cutting concern holding license to remove timber from native land, sought declara-
tion fixing its liability for rates. Plaintiff had done little work in clearing. Natives
had two small settlements in the tract, in which they had not been disturbed. Issue:
assessment on value of whole block or license; plaintiff as sole occupier under
statute); Edginton & Bernstone v. Waihopai River Board, [19291 N. Z. 823 (plain-
tiff sought declaration fixing basis of taxation and injunction. Land in defendant's
area was subject to tax on unimproved value. Under statute, defendant ordered
a general rate and failed to notify the borough council. The county comncl
levied on capital value).
"Wilcox v. Town of Madison 106 Conn. 223, 137 Atl. 742 (1927), certiorari
denied, 276 U. S. 606, 48 Sup. Ct. 337 (1928) (assessment claimed out of propor-
tion to real value of property, and that classification wrong); Attorney-General v.
Hackney Corp., [1918] 1 Ch. 372 (discrimination); McLean v. Commlssioner of
Taxes, 31 N. Z. 469 (1910) (method of calculation of absentee tax).
'In re Aschrott, [19271 1 Ch. 313 (administrator seeks declaration of estate
duty on securities purchased for German by London branch of German bank, two-
fifths left by will to British and Polish subjects, three-fifths to German and Austrian
subjects); In re Succession Duties Act, 23 Alta. L. R. 521 (1928) (what property
in estate, including provincial bonds, taxable and amount due); Donnelly v. Com-
missioner of Stamps, supra note 159 (plaintiff claims only 5% rate due, as he i
a relative within fourth degree, not 10% as claimed).
"TIn the Matter of the Estate of Drew, [1923] 1 Ir. R. 35 (whether freehold
or personalty of testator should bear estate duty); East London Hosp. v. Cobbett,
30 C. L. R. (Aust.) 278 (1922) (how estate tax to be borne between property In
Tasmania and elsewhere); Manning v. Federal Com'r of Taxation, 40 C. L. R.
(Aust.) 506 (1928) (whether plaintiff liable as trustee); Death v. Gower, [19161
N. Z. 751 (whether plaintiff vendor or defendant vendee is liable for mortgage tax).
"Steuart v. Parochial Board of Keith, 8 M. 26 (Scot. 1869) (plaintiff sought
declarator that he was entitled to greater deductions than the blanket deduction
given and that the method used by defendant in fixing the blanket deduction was
illegal); Swinburne v. Federal Com'r of Taxation, supra note 155 (case stated to
determine whether a certain institution was a charitable institution within statu-
tory definition and whether plaintiff was entitled to deduction for gift of money
to it); Hoysted v. Federal Com'r of Taxation, 29 C. L. R. (Aust.) 537 (1921),
rev'd, 37 C. L. R. (Aust.) 290 (1925) (case stated to determine whether cer-
tain persons were joint owners for purposes of taxation, thus entitling their trus-
tees to certain assessments and deductions); Union Steamship Co. of New Zea-
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questions involving factors concerning time.1c9 In all these cases
the declaratory action has made judicial recourse as simple as ad-
ministrative recourse before a board of tax appeals, an end earnestly
to be desired.
ELECTIONS
ENGLISH precedents have established for numerous British
jurisdictions statutory provisions designating a judge of the High
Court as the qualified authority to pass upon contested elections
and to declare the name of the person elected or whether the election
is void.170 American judges passing upon contested elections often
perform the same function, although the term "declaratory judg-
ments" is not used in the authorizing statutes or the decisions them-
selves. There is no reason, however, why the many questions of
law associated with the holding of an election cannot usefully be
settled by declaration, and to some extent that has already happened.
land v. Federal Com'r of Taxation, 35 C. L. R. (Aust.) 209 (1924) (case stated
to determine proper construction of a statute and the tax deductions to be allowed);
Commissioner of Stamps (Western Australia) v. West Australian Trustee, Executor
& Agency Co., 36 C. L. R. (Aust.) 98 (1925) (executor sought to determine whether
income taxes made on the basis of the testator's returns and paid should be deducted
as debts); Taupo Totara Timber Co. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 31 N. Z. 617 (1912)
(plaintiff sought declaration fixing its right to make certain deductions under statute.
Plaintiff wished to deduct value of standing timber cut and used in the course of
business in fixing gross proceeds).
"-Box Elder County v. Conley, County Assessor, supra note 157 (whether prop-
erty in jurisdiction during the tax year); Granby Consol. Mining, Smelting & Power
Co. v. Attorney-General, 31 B. C. 262 (1922) (that taxes had not yet become in
arrears, so as to justify discount); Bank of New Zealand v. Commissioner of Stamps,
[1916] N. Z. 1 (where property owned at certain time); Borough of Birkenhead v.
Colonial Sugar Refining Co., [19231 N. Z. 445 (time for appeal from valuation);
BADiscH.R VERWALTUNGSGERICHTS OP (March 23, 1909), 2 SORGEL , JAMuUCH D.
VERWALTUNGSRECTS 499 (time and conditions for suit to clear uncertainties).
"The declaratory nature of this procedure is dearly shown in the ComOn.w-
wEALTa [o AUSTRALIA] ELECToRAL ACT (1918-1919) § 189, in the definition of
the jurisdiction of the High Court:
"iv. To declare that any person who was returned as elected was not duly
elected;
v. To declare any candidate duly elected who was not returned as elected;
vL To declare any election absolutely void."
Similar language is to be found in the following statutes: NEw SouT WAzxs
PA ARY ELECTORATE AND ELECTIONS ACT (1912-1929) §§ 156, 161 (v-vii);
QUEENsLAND ELECnONS ACT (1915-1930) §§ 2, 117; ALBERTA CoNTMovF.RrT ELXc-
TioNS ACT (1922) c. 5, §§ 3, 4, 21; NEW BRUNSWICK CONTROVERTED ELECnIONs ACT
(1925) c. 5, §§ 5 (2), 28; NOVA SconA CONTRovERTED ELrEcToNs ACT (1923) c. 5,
§ 40; SASKATCHwAN CONhOVERTE.D ELECTnOxS ACT (1930) c. 6, § 4.
Another form of statute uses the word "determine" to describe the result of
the trial, as in the 'case of some declaratory judgment pleadings: PAPL.-m,,
ELFcTIoNs ACT, 1868 (31 and 32 Vicr. c. 125) §§ 2, 11 (1), (13); DoMnIxon for
CANADA] CoNIovERTF- ELrcnoxs ACT (1927) C. 50, § 57; BRrnis- COLuJmrA Co::-
TRovERTED ELECTIONS ACT (1924) c. 76, §§ 191 ct seq.; MAT.roA Co:-TiovEnTrn
ELECTIONS AT (1924) C. 39, §§ 65 et seq.; ONTARIo CoNTRoT.RTEn E.EC:s ACT
(1927) c. 11, §§ 50 et seq.
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Whether an elector is recognized as having an adequate legal in-
terest to challenge the legality of every aspect of an election is a
matter on which jurisdictions differ. But issues have been success-
fully raised by declaration as to the qualifications of electors in a
particular election,171 as to the eligibility of a candidate or the term
for which the candidate has been or may be elected,112 and as to
the compliance of the administrative authorities holding the election
with the prescriptions of the election laws. 3
CONCLUSION
THESE many illustrations of the issues which daily arise be-
tween the administration and the individual and between administra-
tive authorities inter se will have indicated the convenience and effi-
cacy of the declaratory action as contrasted with other forms of re-
lief. Not only are the inconveniences and pitfalls of'the extraordi-
nary legal remedies and of injunction thereby avoided, but the legal-
ity of public demands and requirements can be put to the test before
rather than after enforcement with sufficient speed to avoid hamper-
ing the administration and yet with an advance guaranty of legality.
The dangers and risks, the losses and penalties, thereby averted re-
quire no further elaboration. The efficiency and security thus
afforded the operations of the government to the advantage both
of the public and the private interest commend the declaratory judg-
ment as an integral instrument of effective administration.
"aIn re Freeholders of Hudson County, 105 N. J. L. 57, 143 Atl. $36 (1928)
(declaration of unconstitutionality sought, on ground that it deprived qualified voters
of their right to vote. Court somewhat reluctantly considered it a contested issue
and rendered judgment); Borough of Takapuna v. Takapuna Tramways & Ferry
Co., [1926] N. Z. 796 (who were qualified voters at election to approve purchase
of tramway system).
"McGinnis v. Cossar, 230 Ky. 213, 18 S. W. (2d) 988 (1929) (defendant had
been elected to serve out unexpired term, hence had not been elected to "full term"
and was eligible for re-election. Taxpayers' action); Robinson v. Moser, supra noto 97
(term of office of plaintiff, incumbent, placed in doubt by new statute under which
defendant claims office) ; Enmeier v. Blaize, supra note 97 (when plaintiff's term will
end and defendant successor's begin); Wingate, Surrogate v. Flynn, Sec. of State,
supra note 97 (length of plaintiff's term, six or fourteen years, and if only six years,
defendant's duty to list the office as open for election. See remarks of BIss, J.);
Fox, Dist. Atty. v. Ross, supra note 97 (that plaintiff's term ran until the expiratlon
of the term of his predecessor).
"'In re Annexation of a Part of Lancaster Township to City of Lancaster, 6 D.
& C. 36 (Pa. 1924) (county commissioners, in printing ballots, are not acting legally.
Taxpayer plaintiff held to have no special interest); State ex rel. Binner v. Bucr,
174 Wis. 120, 182 N. W. 855 (1921) (declaration to restrain administrative action
in connection with election of judges considered injunction) ; Simkin v. City of Rock
Springs, 33 Wyo. 166, 237 Pac. 245 (1925) (taxpayer elector sues for declaration
that election for issuance of bonds was invalid, because not held in accordance with
statute); Hair v. Town of Meaford, 31 Ont. L. Rep. 124 (1914) (invalidity of
elections for irregularities and illegality of submission).
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